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Bus Priority at Traffic Signals—
Evaluating Strategy Options
FraserMcLeodandNickHounsell
UniversityofSouthampton,UnitedKingdom

Abstract
Thisarticlecomparesdifferentstrategyoptionsforproviding buspriorityattraffic
signals.Thedifferentstrategiesconsideredvaryinthestrengthofthepriorityawarded
andintheselectionofthebusesthataretoreceivepriority.Thestrategiesincludesocalleddifferentialpriority,wherebusesreceiveindividualpr ioritytreatmentaccordingtosomecriterionsuchaslateness,andnondifferentialpriority,whereallbusesare
treatedinthesameway.
Thestrategiesarecomparedusingasimulationmodel,SPLIT,thathasbeendevelopedandvalidatedbytheauthors.Thearticledescribessomeofthemodellingissues
thatareinvolvedinsimulatingbusprioritysystemsandhowtheyhavebeentreated
withintheSPLITmodel.
Introduction
Bustransitpriorityattrafficsignalshasbeenusedinmanyc itiesworldwideandis
becoming increasingly accepted as a way in which bus operations  can be improved,complementingothermeasuressuchasbuslanesandauto matedticketingarrangements.Oneofthereasonswhytheuseofbuspriorit yattrafficsignals
iswidespreadisthatitcanbeappliedalmostanywhere,asthe reisnoneedfor
additionalroadspaceforbusesorforbusestobesegregatedf romgeneraltraffic.
Example applications of bus priority at traffic signals include London, Tokyo,
1
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Melbourne, and Portland, Oregon. The state-of-the-art in bus pr iority applicationsinEuropewasreviewedbyHounsellandWall(2002).
ThisarticledescribesresearchundertakeninaEuropeanUnion fundedproject,
PRISCILLA,investigatingtheperformanceofdifferentbusprior itystrategies.These
strategiesdifferedfromoneanotherintermsofthestrengthofthepriorityactionstakenandintheselectionofwhichbusestogivepriorit yto.Theformof
prioritywheredifferentbusesareawardeddifferentlevelsofpriority,usuallyaccordingtoabuslatenesscriterion,isknownas differentialpriority.
Themajorityofreportedbuspriorityapplicationstendtobei mplementedona
singlebuscorridororonasmallnumberofbuscorridors.One oftheobjectivesof
thisresearchwastowidentheapplicationtoconsiderbusprio rityoveracitywide
busnetwork.ThecityusedherewasSouthamptonintheUnitedK ingdom.
Theresearchwasbasedonthebuspriorityfacilitiesavailable withintheSCOOT
trafficsignalcontrolsystem,asdevelopedbytheTransportationResearchLaboratory (TRL) in the United Kingdom (Bretherton et al. 1996). Upda ted details of
these facilities are reported at the website: http://www.scoot-utc.com/
SCOOTFacilities/busprior.htm.Thebasicpriorityactionsthatcanbetakenunder
thiscontrolsystemaretogiveanapproachingbusextragreentimetogetthrough
the junction or to recall the required signal phase sooner than  would be done
otherwise. Since these priority actions are fundamental to the majority of bus
prioritycontrolsystems,theresultspresentedherewillbeof generalinterestand
application.
Assessmentofdifferentbusprioritystrategieswasundertaken usingasimulation
model,SelectivePrioritytoLatebusesImplementedatTrafficsignals(SPLIT),that
hasbeendesignedanddevelopedbytheauthorssince1996(McLe od1998).This
articleincludesdetailsofsomefeaturesofthismodel,includ ingthemodellingof
buses,passengers,nonprioritytraffic,andhowtheyinteractwitheachother.
The network used was based on the City of Southampton in the Un ited Kingdom.Thearticledescribesthenetworktopology,busservicesmodelled,routes
taken,andnumbersoftrafficsignalsencountered.Resultsand conclusionsfrom
thesimulationrunsofthedifferentbusprioritystrategiesar edescribed.

The Bus Priority System
Theresearchpresentedherewasbaseduponthebuspriorityfac ilitiesavailable
within the SCOOT traffic signal control system (Bretherton et a l. 1996). This
2
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sectionprovidesabriefdescriptionofthesefacilitiesandgivesdetailsoftheprioritystrategiesconsidered.
Priority Levels

Differentlevelsofprioritycanbeawardedtodifferentbuses, typicallyaccordingto
thelatenessoftheindividualbus.Eachprioritylevelisdefi nedbyparametersthat
specifythetrafficdegreeofsaturationconditionsunderwhich thebusisallowed
toreceiveeither:
1. asignalextension,wherethebusisdetectedonagreensignalaspect,which
ismaintaineduntilthebuspassesby,or
2. a signal recall, where the bus is detected on a red signal aspect, whose
length is reduced so that the desired green signal aspect comes  around
quicker.
Thesedegreeofsaturationparameterscanbeusedtoconstrain thebuspriority
actions, where desired, to ensure that delays to nonpriority tr affic streams are
acceptable.Clearly,thedefinitionofacceptablehereisaquestionofpolicyand
willdependonanumberofpoliticalfactors.
Fourdifferentprioritylevelswereconsideredinthisresearch(Table1).

Table 1. Priority Levels
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Priority Strategies

Anumberofdifferentprioritystrategieswereconsidered,vary ingbothinthelevel
ofpriorityawardedandinthebusesthatreceivethepriority.Theprioritystrategiesaredescribedbelow.
PrioritystrategyP0NoPriority.
None of the buses in the network are given priority. This is th e base case
againstwhichtheotherprioritystrategiesarecompared.
PriorityStrategyP1ExtensionsOnly.
Allbusesinthenetworkareawardedtrafficsignalextensions, whererequired,
buttrafficsignalrecallsarenotawardedtoanybus.Thisisamoderateformof
priority that, from previous experience, has little or no negat ive effect on
nonpriority traffic.
PriorityStrategyP2PrioritytoLateBusesOnly.
Busesthatarelatereceivethehighestprioritylevel,whileb usesthatareon
timeorearlydonotreceiveanypriority.
PriorityStrategyP3HybridofP1andP2.
Inthisstrategybusesthatarelatereceivefullprioritywhil eotherbusesare
eligibleforatrafficsignalextensiononly.Thismaybejustifiablebecauseextensionsprovidesubstantialdelaysavingstothesmallproportion ofbuses(~10%)
forwhichanextensionisappropriate.
PriorityStrategyP4FullPriority.
Thehighestlevelofpriorityisawardedtoallbuses.Thisis themostextreme,
strongest priority strategy possible and the most likely to hav e a negative
effectonnonprioritytraffic.
Central or Local Control

TrafficsignalextensionscanbecontrolledbythecentralSCOOTcomputerorby
thelocaltrafficsignalcontroller.Themainadvantageoflocalcontrolisthatafaster
response to buses can be achieved than through central control,  which incurs
delaysduetotransmissionlagsbetweenthelocaltrafficsigna lcontrollerandthe
centralSCOOTcomputer.Afastresponseisparticularlyimportantfortheawarding of a traffic signal extension, as it has a direct influence  on the window of
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opportunityforgaininganextension.Theeffectofatransmissionlagof xsecondsisequivalent,ineffect,todetectingthebusxsecondsclosertothestopline.
Inpractice,centralcontrolisoftenpreferred,however,asitiseasiertosetupand
maintain.
Restricting Recalls

PreviousexperienceofbuspriorityapplicationsinLondon(Hou nselletal.1996)
foundthattrafficsignalrecallscansometimeshaveadamaging effectonnonpriority
traffic. This is particularly true when the nonpriority traffic flow is high, as can
happenwhentheprioritybusturnsintoabusymainroadfroma sideroad.One
of the reasons for this negative effect is the resulting loss o f good traffic signal
coordinationonthemainroad.Bearingthisinmind,itseemss ensibletorestrict
traffic signal recalls to junctions where the total volume of n onpriority traffic,
summedoverallofthenonprioritytrafficarms,isbelowsome specifiedlimit.For
the purposes of this research, a limit of 1,500 vehicles/hour w as specified and
simulationrunswithandwithoutthisrestrictioninplacewere madetoinvestigatetheeffects.

Simulation Network Details
Thebusprioritysystemwasmodelledusingasimulationmodel,SPLIT,developed
bytheauthorssince1996.Detailsofthemodelanditsvalidat ionareprovidedby
McLeod (1998). The following sections provide information about  some of the
modellingaspectsoftheresearch,includingmodellingoftheb uses,passengers,
othertraffic,andtheirinteractions.
Bus Network

ThebusnetworkusedwasbasedontheCityofSouthampton,Unit edKingdom.
Southamptonhasapopulationofaround215,000butwithatrave ltoworkarea
populationofapproximately500,000.Itisaregionalcenterwi ththeportasthe
mainindustry.Southamptonisconstrainedbytheseatothesouthandtworivers
thatdissecttheCity.Aswithmostcitiesthroughouttheworld,theCitycouncils
policieslimittheuseofprivatetransportwithinthehighlyd evelopedareaand
promotetheuseofpublictransport.
The modelled network consisted of six bus services operating on  overlapping
routes. These bus services run between the city center to the s outh and
SouthamptonAirportandtheUniversityofSouthamptonattheno rthernendof
theCity.DetailsofthesebusservicesareshowninTable2.
5
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Table 2. Bus Services in Southampton SPLIT Network

Bus Punctuality

Buspunctuality,orlateness,wasanimportantconsideration,a sitaffectedwhich
busesreceivedpriorityunderthedifferentialbusprioritystr ategies(P2andP3).
Buslatenesswascalculatedforeachbuswheneverthebusdepar tedfromabus
stopandwasdefinedtobethedifferencebetweentheactualde parturetimeand
thescheduleddeparturetime.Busentrytimesontothenetwork werevariedin
thesimulationrunstogivearangeofdifferentstartingcondi tionsforbuses,in
termsoftheirlatenessatthestartoftheroute.Anexamplef requencydistribution
of bus lateness near the start of one of the routes being model led is shown in
Figure 1. This frequency distribution was based on a sample of five days data
collection.
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Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Lateness

Bus Passengers

PassengerarrivalsatbusstopsintheSouthamptonnetworkwere obtainedfrom
on-streetsurveysandwereusedtovalidatethesimulationmode l.Forhighfrequencybusservices(10-minutefrequencyormore),itwasfound thatpassengers
tendedtoarriveatrandom.Forlowerfrequencyservices,there wasatendencyfor
passengerstotimetheirarrivaltimeaccordingtotheschedule darrivaltimeofthe
bus.Thistendencywasmostmarkedatthelowestfrequencyserv iceconsidered
here (30-minute frequency).
Traffic Congestion

Bus travel times along a route vary from day to day according t o a number of
factors,includingtrafficcongestion.Clearlytrafficcongestionwillhaveasignificanteffectonbuspunctualityandonanybusprioritycontrol strategythattries
tomaintainbusesrunningtoschedule.Although,vehiclesaren otexplicitlymodelledwithinSPLIT,theeffectsofvaryinglevelsoftrafficcongestionwereapproximatedbyvaryingtheamountofjunctiondelayincurredattraff icsignalsbybuses.
Typicaljunctiondelayswereobtainedthroughcollectionofdatafromthetraffic
signal control system, SCOOT, operating in Southampton.
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Results and Evaluation
Thedifferentbusprioritystrategieswerecomparedthroughas eriesofsimulation
runs.Thestrategieswerecomparedintermsoftheireffectson:


bus travel cost saving (euro/hour); this was totalled over the whole bus
networkmodelled(15buses/hour)andreflectstheeffectonbus journey
times through the network;



passengerwaitingcostsaving(euro/hour);thiswastotalledov erallwaiting passengers (~340 passengers per hour) and reflects the regu larity of
thebusserviceandhowlongpassengershavetowaitatbussto ps;



disbenefittononprioritytraffic(euro/hour);thiswastotalle doverallof
thenonprioritytrafficflowsmodelled;thesevariedfromlink tolinkwith
anaveragenonprioritytrafficflowof1,000vehicles/hourappr oximately;
thismeasuretookintoaccountanynegativeimpactoftheprior itysystem
on nonpriority traffic;



overall cost saving (euro/hour); that is, the aggregate of the above cost
savingslessthedisbenefittononprioritytraffic.

Costsforthewholenetwork,intermsofeuro/hour,werechosenasperformance
measurestoallowadirectcomparisonbetweenthedifferentaspectsofperformance, namely the effects on bus journey times, passengers wait ing times and
delay to nonpriority traffic. Costs per bus, per passenger or p er vehicle are not
shownherebutcanbereadilyderivedbydividingbytheapprop riatenumbersof
buses,passengers,andvehiclesasstatedabove.
Resultsfromthedifferentprioritystrategiesarecomparedin Figure2.
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Figure 2. Effect of Priority Strategy

Comparison Strategies

EffectonBusTravelTime
Asonemightexpect,bustraveltimesavingsincreaseasthepr ioritystrengthis
increasedandasmorebusesreceivepriority.
ThelargestsavingisseenforstrategyP4,wherethehighestl evelofprioritywas
giventoallbuses.
EffectonPassengerWaitingTimes
Thelargestpassengerwaitingtimesavingisfoundforthediff erentialpriority
strategy(P2),whereonlylatebusesreceivepriority.
A smaller waiting time saving was found for strategy P3, where late buses
receivedfullpriorityandotherbuseswereeligibletoreceive atrafficsignal
extension.
Whereallbusesweretreatedidentically(i.e.,nondifferential priority),theeffectsonpassengerwaitingtimewerenegligibleorworse).
InthecaseofstrategyP4,whereallbusesreceivedthehighestlevelofpriority,
anegativeeffectonpassengerwaitingtimewasfound.Thereas onforthiswas
that some buses in the model were ahead of schedule and were st ill given
9
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priorityunderthisscenario.Inpractice,itislikelythatth erewouldbesome
form of bus fleet control, separate from the bus priority syste m, to avoid
busesrunningaheadofschedule.Thisresultwouldnotgenerall ybeexpected.
EffectonDelaytoNonpriorityTraffic
Thereisanegativeeffectonnonprioritytrafficthattendsto increasethemore
priorityisgiventobuses.Itshouldbeexplained,however,thatthiseffectis
builtintotheSPLITsimulationmodelbasedonmeasurementstak eninfield
trialsinLondon(Hounselletal.1996).Explicitmodellingof trafficandtheir
interactionwiththebuspriorityactionstakenattrafficsignalsisnotundertakeninSPLIT.
OverallEffect
Twodifferentialprioritystrategies,P2andP3,gavethebestoverallresults,as
theyhadpositiveeffectsonbothbustraveltimeandpassenger waitingtime
andonlyarelativelysmallnegativeeffectonnonprioritytraf fic.
Thefullprioritystrategy,P3,didnotperformsowelloverallhere,asbustravel
timebenefitswerecancelledoutbynegativeeffectsonpasseng erwaitingtime
anddisbenefitstononprioritytraffic.
Central or Local Extensions

Theresultsofimplementingtrafficsignalextensionseitherlo callyorcentrallyare
compared in Figure 3. The priority strategy used here was to aw ard extensions
only(strategyP1).Itcanbeseenthattheoverallbenefit,ta kingbothbusesand

Figure 3. Comparison of Central and Local Traffic Signal Extensions
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generaltrafficintoaccount,increasedfromaround15euros/ho urto25euros/
hour,asaresultofmovingfromcentralcontroltolocalcontrol.
Restricting Recalls

The effect of restricting traffic signal recalls to those junctions where the total
nonprioritytrafficflowwaslessthan1,500vehicles/houriss howninFigure4for
twodifferentprioritystrategies:differentialprioritystrategy(P2)andfullpriority
strategy (P3). With this restriction in place, the number of re calls awarded was
reducedbyabout20percent.ItcanbeseenfromFigure4that restrictingtraffic
signalrecallshas:


reducedthebenefitstobuses,



increasedbenefitstononprioritytraffic,



forthedifferentialprioritystrategy,theseresultshavecancelledeachother,
and



forthefullprioritystrategy,therehasbeenasmallnetoverallbenefithere,
although,thisresultisspecifictotherelativebusandnonpr ioritytraffic
flowsusedinthissimulationrun,asdescribedearlier.

Figure 4. Restricting Number of Traffic Signal Recalls
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Conclusions
Anumberofdifferentbusprioritystrategieshavebeencompare d.Thesehavehad
differentimpactsonbusjourneytime,buspassengerwaitingti meandondelayto
nonprioritytraffic.TheseimpactsaresummarizedinTable3.

Table 3. Impacts of Priority Strategies

Thedifferentialprioritystrategies(i.e.,thosethattargetp riorityforlatebuses)give
thebestresults,astheyprovideagoodbalancebetweentravel timesavingsand
passengerwaitingtimesavings.Inaddition,sincethenumbero fbusesthatreceive
fullpriorityisrestricted,thereislesschanceofthebuspr iorityactionshavinga
damagingeffectonnonprioritytraffic.
Fullprioritytoallbusesisnotgenerallyrecommendeddueto thepossiblenegative impact on nonpriority traffic and since this does not usua lly improve the
regularityofthebusservice.Fullprioritytoallbusesmight beadvantageouswhere
thenonprioritytrafficflowisrelativelyinsignificantinvol ume.Thismightbethe
casewherebusestravelalongamajorroadandthesideroadtrafficflowislow.
Caremustbetakentoensurethatthebusprioritysystemdoes nothaveaserious
negativeeffectonothertraffic.Thisismostlikelytohappen asaresultofawarding
toomanytrafficsignalrecalls,particularlywhenitinvolves shorteningthelength
ofthemainroadstage.Thereisastrongcaseforrestricting thenumberofrecalls
awardedtobuseswherethenonprioritytrafficflowishigh.

12
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It is desirable to implement traffic signal extensions locally, at the traffic signal
controller,ratherthanviathecentralcontrolcomputer,astheopportunitiesfor
busesgainingtrafficsignalextensionsareincreased.Thisisduetotheavoidanceof
thetransmissionlagassociatedwiththecommunicationbetween thetrafficsignalcontrollerandthecentralcomputeroperatingthebusprior itysystem.Anticipatedbenefitstobuspassengerswereconfirmedbythesimulati onruns. Provisionoflocaltrafficsignalextensionsrequiresspecialcondit ioningoftrafficsignal
controllers.Thisadditionalworkcouldactasabarriertoimplementationoflocal
extensionsandthepreferenceofusingcentralextensionsinSCOOT.

13
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Contract Areas and Service
Quality Issues
in Public Transit Provision:
Some Thoughts on the European
and Australian Context
DavidA.Hensher,TheUniversityofSydney

Abstract
Theintroductionofcontractregimesfortheprovisionofbuss ervices,suchascompetitivetendering1andperformance-basedcontracts,isusuallypremisedonaprior
assumptionthatthesizeofthephysicalcontractareaisgivenandthatanypolicies
relatedtointeractionsbetweencontractareas,suchasintegra tedticketingand
fares,2areagreedto.Thisarticleexaminestheevolvingargumentsth atencouragea
reviewofcontractareasizesbeforerecontractingandthepositionssupportingthe
benefitsofservicequality-relatedissuessuchasanintegratedfarespolicy.Giventhat
agrowingnumberofanalysts(especiallyinEuropeandAustrali a)arepromotingthe
appealofincreasingphysicalcontractareasizetofacilitate, amongotherreasons,an
integratedfareregime,itistimelytoexploretheprosandco nsforsuchreformto
ensurethattheyarenotcounterproductivetothedesiredoutcomesofareform
process.Theargumentspresentedherecautionthesupportfortoosmallanumber
oflargecontractareasongroundsofinternalefficiencylosse sandlimitedgainsin
networkeconomies(butsupportamalgamatingverysmallcontractareas).Existing
15
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empiricalevidence,limitedasitis,tendstosupportcontract areas(anddepots)
currentlyservicedbyfleetsizesintherange30to100regard lessofurbandevelopmentprofile.Alternativewaysofdeliveringcross-regionalandbroad-basednetwork
benefitsareproposed.
Introduction
Reformofthebussectorinmanycountrieshasfocussedonalte rnativeservice
deliveryregimessuchascompetitivetendering3andperformance-basedquality
contracts(see,forexample,HensherandStanley[2003]andPre stonandvande
Velde[2002]fordetails).Twoissuesthatarisewhendetailingspecificreformstrategiesarethegeographicaldefinitionoftheservicearea(ore venwhetheritisa
single route as in London) and the flow-through implications of  service quality
initiativessuchasintegratedfares.4Thelatterrelatestotheabilityofapassengerto
travelbetweenpublictransportmodesandoperatorsonasingle fareaswellas
potentiallyofferingtimesavings.5)
Indevelopinganimplementationplanforperformance-basedcont racts(suchas
theonedevelopedbyHensherandHoughton[2003]),anumberof commentators have raised the question of how many contracts should best  be provided
within a particular geographical setting. Should we take the ex isting contracts
(and areas) or rationalize the contracts to a smaller number? A rguments proposedforfewercontractareasaremainlyrelatedtoadministra tivecoherenceand
passenger benefits from network integration. A concern with few er contracts
(dependingonthemeaningoffewer)isthepotentiallossof internalefficiency
andthehighriskofmonopolypowerand/ormarketdominance,wi thresultant
pressuresongovernmenttoincreasesubsidiesbeyondwhatcurre ntlyexistand/
orareinanysenseoptimal.
Thisarticleexaminestheargumentsforandagainstarangeof reforminitiatives
associatedwiththedeterminationofthegeographicalsizeofc ontractareas,as
wellasrevenueallocationandpatronagebenefitissueslinked tointegratedfares
associated with cross-contract service delivery. Although the article focuses on
Australia(Sydneyinparticular),andtoalesserextentEurope ,toillustratesomeof
theevidence,theargumentspresentedareofrelevanceuniversa llyandareespeciallyusefulfortheUnitedStates,whichappearstolagbehin dthereformprogramsofEuropeandAustralia.6
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Contract Area Size and Number
Theproblemisthatindividualfirmsinthetransportationindu striesprovideserviceonlyoverlimitedportionsofanetwork, but
[some]customersdemandsextendovertheentirenetwork.The
necessityofprovidingthrough servicefromanyorigintoany
destinationrequirescooperationamongfirmswhoarealsoexpectedtocompeteinthenewenvironmentofregulatoryreform.
Theseindustrieshavebeenregulatedinthepastpreciselytodeal
withtheinterconnectandcompetitiveaccessissues.Butthe[competitionpolicy]lawsgenerallypresumethatfirmsshouldcompete
[inapotentialifnoactualsense],notcooperate.(Tye1987:xviii)
Istheresuchathingasanoptimalcontractareasizeinageo graphicalsense?7What
criteriamightoneapplytodecideonthis?Presumablytheansw errelatestodemand-sideconsiderations,suchasnetworkconnectivityimpacts (economiesof
scopethroughnetworks,integratedfares,etc.),andthesupply-side,intermsof
costandservicedeliveryefficiencies.Itisnotdissimilarto theargumentsonthe
optimalnumberoffirmsinanindustry.8
Therearetwoissues(atleast)toaddress:(1)whatlikelycha ngesinnetworkservice
delivery are desired and can be achieved by amalgamating contra ct areas that
cannotbeachievedbyalternativestrategies,suchasestablish ingnetworkalliances
(evenincentive-basedones9)withintheexistingcontractarearegime;and(2)will
suchamalgamationslosetheinternal(toanoperator)efficienc iesthatcurrently
existandwhichpromotesufficientobservationsforbenchmarkin gperformance?
Howmanycontractareasareappropriate?PrestonandvandeVelde(2002)commentthattheU-shapedsubsidyprofiledetectedovertimeincompetitivetendering is, in part, due to the winners curse10 but more importantly in the current
context,inpart,duetoexcessiveconcentrationorcollusion. Theuppingofprices
inrebidsisbecomingcommon(asobservedinEuropeinparticul ar)asthenumberofbiddersdrops(asaresultoffeweroperatorsinthemar ket).Contractarea
sizeisafeatureoftheliteratureonspatialmonopolywheree achcontractareamay
beinthehandsofafewoperatorswhoareabletocolludeacti vitiesacrosscontract
areasundertheircontrol.Byamalgamatingcontractareasthis istantamountto
thesameimplicationsforefficiency(albeitlegally)ascollusion.
Thetrade-offsbetweennetwork/demandeconomiesandinternalef ficiencywill
dependonanumberofstructuralandhistoricallycontingentch aracteristicsin17
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cluding such different aspects as urban development and operato r culture
(Carlquist2002).ThiswascertainlytrueintheSydneycontext intheearly1990s
whentheNSW1990PassengerTransportActwasintroduced.Itdefinedasuiteof
78 contract areas based primarily on incumbency (tantamount to grandfather
rights).Sincethenthenumberofoperatorshasbeenreduced,w hilethecontract
areashaveremainedintact.Newglobaloperatorshavemovedin toSydney(e.g.,
NationalExpressfromtheUnitedKingdom,ConnexandTransdevfromFrance)
lookingforopportunitiestoexpandintheAustralianmarket.W heregeographicallyadjacentoperatorshavebeenwillingtosell,inpartdue topressurestosell
fromthelargeglobaloperators,butalsobecauseofthepercei veduncertaintyof
the new reform agenda (under discussion in 2003 but without a d irection to
date),thereisevidenceoflargerserviceareasunderoneoper ator(strictlythesame
contract areas as before but now bringing a capability of cross -contract operations).
TheStateTransitAuthorityofNewSouthWales(STA),thegovernment-owned
operator,isthelargestoperatorwith26contractsandrunsthepublicbusnetworkwhichcoversalmosthalfofSydney(1.61.8millionpopula tion,nearly800
squarekilometres,and1,750busesoperatingoutof11depots) centeredonthe
SydneyCBD(SeeFigure1).Ithasmanyadjacentcontractareas sothatitsservices
arenotdeliveredonacontractareabasisperse,operatingas oneverylargeprovider.TheSTAhasdesignedaroutenetworkofservicesthattakespassengersto
keycentersacrossaregion,notjustwithinthecontractarea. Thisnetworkeconomy
isachieved,however,atarelativelyhighinternalinefficienc ycostof$4.86perbus
kilometer11(incontrasttothebestpracticecostof$2.60/buskilometerf orprivate
operatorswhocurrentlyhave53contractsamong30operators). Theimportant
questionhereinistheextenttowhichthecross-contractarea serviceprovision
hascontributedtothesehigherunitcostsorwhetheritisthe productofgovernmentownershipandspecificrestrictionsofservicedelivery.Partcanbeattributed
toexternalitiessuchastrafficcongestion.BasedontheSTAsoperationsoutsideof
theSydneyMetropolitanArea(inNewcastle,aregionalCenter1 20kmsfromSydney
withapopulationofabout500,000),wecouldreducethe$4.86 to$3.54(Daniels
2002). However internal inefficiency must account for much of t he remaining
incrementabove$2.60.

18
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Figure 1. The Sydney Metropolitan Area and the STA Contract Area

19

JournalofPublicTransportation,Vol.6,No.3,2003

The literature on industrial organization from which ideas cent ral to tendering
evolvedsuchasprincipal-agentrelationships,transactionscos ts,andeconomies
ofscaleandscope,putsforwardcompellingargumentsthatmany ofthegainsin
service delivery to the market can be effected through preserva tion of smaller
effectivemanagementunitsworkingwithinarangeofalliances tructures,where
eachallianceisestablishedtobestaccommodatetheinterests ofthemarket(i.e.,
customers)andtheinterestsofthesupplyingstakeholders(see HayandVickers
[1987] and Williamson [1987]). To assume that one large organization with a
singlelargecontractarea(orevenafewunderanoligopoly)isthebestwayforwardinservicingthemarketisquestionable.Itassumesthatt hetransactionscosts
betweenoperatorsandcustomersareexcessiveandthetransacti onscostswithin
anorganizationarenonexistentorminimal12. Indeed the literature on the economictheoryofregulation(orcapturetheory)describeshowregulatoryagencies may end up more or less in the pocket of those whom they p urport to
regulate.Theresponseinsomeindustrieshasbeenthedismantl ingofsuchregulatory frameworks through economic deregulation (e.g., airlines , telecommunications),withareplacedregulatoryregimefocusedonmonitori ng.
Thereisananalogousliteraturearguingforlocalspecializati onandalliancesinsteadoftheformationoflarge,single-entitybusinesses.Inde ed,itdoesnottake
longbeforeweseemanyoftheverylargeentitiesessentially operatingasasetof
separate entities with occasional cross-subsidy to facilitate short-run (at least)
viabilityacrosstheentiresetoforganizationsundertheone control.Thisbreeds
inefficiency(likegovernmentsbailingouttheirownpublicmon opolies)andupward pressures on subsidy support from government. As Preston a nd van de
Velde (2002) state  governments caving in to operators suffering from the
winners curse or generally finding life tough was a real threat to competitive
tenderinginsomecountriesandsituations.
Fundamentally, the reduction in the number of contract areas runs the risk of
furtherpromotingdominanceandafurthermoveawayfromtheid ealsofcompetitionpolicy.13Itisadangerousmoveifiterodesthecompetitivebaseofthebus
marketinthesensethatitreducestheabilitytopromoteand maintainaprocess
ofeffectiveorpotentialcompetitionsoastoachieveamoree fficientallocationof
resources.14Inlargemeasure,wehavetoputtothetestthecasethatsuc hamalgamations deliver additional benefits that more than outweigh t he additional
costs.
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Howeveralliancesdonotjusthappen.Themarketmaywellsend signalstoencouragesuchalliancesbutthereisnoguaranteethatthesigna lswillberegistered
andactedupon.Toensuremarketsignalactivation,appropriateinformationand
incentives needtobeputinplace.Government,through itsregulatoryagency,
canmakeamajorcontributiontothisprocess.Inthepresenceofimperfectinformation,signalingandincentivesystemsareatthecenterstage.Todateinmost
internationalsettingswhereregulatoryreformisactive,thereislittleevidenceof
alliances (although see Norway in the next paragraph), which is  disappointing,
butthismaywellbeexplainedbythestrategicintentofthen ew(global)players
andthelackofincentivesinthepast.Theevolutionofallian ceswillrequiremuch
moreincentive-driveninitiativesbytheregulatorespeciallyw herethereisalossof
internal efficiency due to the scale of operations. There is no  denying that this
happens, but what is important is the size of an operator beyon d which such
internal efficiencies come into play. In Sydney, for example, where most recent
purchasesinvolveoperatorscontrollingmorethan100buses,th eseareworrying
signals(seeevidencebelow).
There is an interesting history of cooperation and merger in Be rgen, Norway
(Carlquist2002).Althoughamergerattemptbetweenthetwomaj oroperators
failedintheearly1990s,itledtosubstantialrouteandfare cooperation.In1998a
new merger attempt succeeded. Furthermore, all bus companies in  the region
alreadycooperatedinanallianceregardingelectronicticketin gfarecoordination
andpurchasing.Itwas,therefore,easyfortheregionalpublic transportauthority
toimposearequirementforintegratedfaresintheperformance contract,initiatedin2000.Theoperatorswereobligedtohaveacommonticke tingsystemand
fare tariff, but there is no limit to the upper fare level. The re is no evidence to
support(orfalsify)theexistenceofnewpatronageattractionorincreasedbenefits
toexistingpassengers,althoughCarlquist(2002)suggeststhat thelatterismore
likelythantheformer.Ineithercase,itwouldbedifficulttohypothesisethata
successfulintegrationwasduetoregulatoryintervention,asasuccessfulalliance
betweentheoperatorsalreadyexisted.
Whether by amalgamation of ownership or alliance formation, the se are both
mergerphenomenon.Forexample,combiningthreecontractareas intoonearea
isa(horizontal)mergerandshouldbeassessedalongthesame linesasthemerger
oftwoorganizations.Ifthereareeconomiesofscale(forthe exactsameservice
type),thenthereareefficiencygains.Therealizationofthesegains,however,could
beoffsetbywelfarelossesduetoreducedcompetition,beita ctualoryardstick,in
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the case of either competitive tendering or performance-based c ontracts (the
latterduringthecontractperiodincompetingforincentivepa yments,theformer
atthetimeofbidding).DeBorgerandKerstens(2000)reviewth eevidenceand
conclude overall that there are no economies of scale but mild economies of
scope associated with demand complementarities where the eviden ce suggests
spatialdemandexistsbeyondcontract/operatorareas.Thelatte risanempirical
issue.ItisinvestigatedbelowforSydneywherethereisverylittleintercontractarea
use of public transport but opportunities for cross-regional se rvices capable of
beingdeliveredefficientlybyasingleoperator.Indeed,asorganizationsincreasein
size,theylosetherelativeprecisionrequiredtoestablishth evalueofspecificactivities;incontrast,throughalliancesthereismuchmoreprecisionandtransparency.
AsynthesisofsomekeythemesisgiveninTable1.

Table 1. Synthesis of Key Issues in Determining
Optimal Size Operator/Contract Area
Theme

Comments



Asitincreases,thereisoperationaldependencyonavailabilityoffixedfacilities(centraldepot,localterminal



Veryhighfixedcostsofdepotswhichrequiresharingofthese
costs

Densityofroutenetwork
andnetworkeconomies

)



Presenceofsuchhighcostsinvolvesatradebetweensharing
costsovermanymoreactivities/services,risksofdiseconomies
ofscaleandeliminationofpotentialcompetition(eitherleadingtoentryunderderegulationorcompetitivetenderingor
competitionforincentivepaymentsunderPBC)

RouteStructure



Thebalancebetweendegreesofhubbingrangingfromhubdominatedtomoreuniformdistributioninurbanareamoves
tolatterasacontinuousspatialdiffusionofurbanactivities
takesplace

Demandcomplements



Attributes of individual services as demand complements
meansthatachangeinfrequency(say)ofoneserviceaffects
thedemandforanother

Internalefficiency



Delivering services under benchmarked best practice in respectofcostefficiency,costeffectiveness,andserviceeffectiveness
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The Theoretical Argument

Therelevantliteratureontheoptimumnumberoffirmsinamar ketfocuseson
thecostandperformancestructureofeachfirmbothinrespect ofthesupplyof
servicesandthewelfarebenefitstopassengersofaspecifics upplyregime.Evidence
ofscaleandscope(especiallynetworkeconomies)isanimporta ntbasisforcommentingontheappropriatenumberofoperators(andhencecontr acts).
Transactioncosteconomics(TCE)providesanappealingframeworkwithinwhich
todeveloptheargumentsfortherolesofthemarketandgovernance.Atransactionoccurswhenonestageofactivityfinishesandanotherbeg ins.Withawellworkinginterfacethesetransfersoccursmoothly.Establishingasmoothtransfer
iswhatnetworkeconomies(includingintegratedfares)areallabout.Theirachievement is possible through a number of strategies such as allianc e contracts and
merger(seetheBergenexperiencecitedabove).TCEsupplantstheusualpreoccupationwithtechnologyanddistributioncosts,withanexaminat ionofthecomparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task compl etion under
alternativegovernancestructures.Itisasmuchabouttransact ionswithinasingle
entity(e.g.,onebusoperator,aregulator)asitisbetweenentities.Itpaysspecial
attentiontoinformationsignalingandprocessing(anditsasym metrythroughoutthesystem),boundedrationality(i.e.,theabilitytoproc essalimitedamount
ofinformation),hazard,opportunism,andassetspecificity.
Transactioncosteconomicsmaintainsthatitisimpossibletoconcentrateallofthe
relevantbargainingactionattheexantecontractingstage(wh ichiswhatcompetitivetenderingessentiallydoes).Instead,bargainingispe rvasiveinwhichcase
theinstitutionsofprivateorderingandthestudyofcontracti nginitsentiretytake
oncriticaleconomicsignificance.Performance-basedcontracts (PBCs)alignwith
thisview(seeHensherandStanley2003)sincethemarketopera tesactivelythroughout the contract period (under signals delivered through incent ive payments).
Thebehavioralattributesofhumanagents,wherebyconditionso fboundedrationalityandopportunismarejoined,andthecomplexattribute softransaction
withspecialreferencetotheconditionofassetspecificity,areresponsibleforthis
condition(Williamson1987:178).Alignmentofincentivesisce ntraltoefficient
contracts and property rights. The latter emphasises that owner ship matters,
withrightsofownershipofanassetdefinedastherightstou setheasset,theright
toappropriatereturnsfromtheasset,andtherighttochange theformand/or
substanceofanasset.
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Transactioncosteconomicsacknowledgesmeritinbothmonopolyandefficient
risk-bearingapproachestocontract.Itinsists,however,thatefficiencypurposes
are sometimes served by restraints on trade. (Williamson 1987:1 88). This statementbyapioneeroftransactionaleconomics,X-efficiency,andcontractingtheory,
iscrucialtothediscussionbecauseitputsforththeargument thatexaminationof
the underlying attributes of transactions discloses that restra ints on trade can
helptosafeguardtheintegrityoftransactionswhenfirm-speci ficinvestmentsare
athazard.
Evidence on Cost Savings from Scale of Operations

Oneusefulanalysistoestablishthepotentialgainsforlarger operations(which
alsomeanslargercontractareasandhencelessoperators)ist olookattheevidenceonperformanceoutcomeswhentenderingfordifferentsize bids.Acaveat:
Thegreatmajorityoftheempiricalevidencefocusesonoperati onalcostsavings
andlittleaboutthetruecostsofconductingtenderingandmon itoringetc.The
competitivetenderingofalargepublicsectorproviderdeliversanimmediatecost
savingbutitisaonce-onlygain.15Thisgainisgreaterwhenthepretenderedunitis
large(asinmostgovernment-ownedbusoperations,suchasoccu rredinLondon
inthe1980sand1990s)anditisbeingtenderedoutasaseto fsmallercontracts.
Subsequentretenderingofthesmallercontracts,however,leads toverylittlecost
savings if any. Indeed, the often-quoted cost savings up to 20 percent (net of
administrativecostsoftendering)donotshedlightonthecru cialquestionasto
whatproportionofthesesavingscanbeattributedtocompetiti vetenderingper
se.16Theswitchtoasmalleroperatorwithlowerfixedcostsandov erheadsinitself,
couldachievethesesavingsregardlessofthemechanismusedto selecttheoperator.
Themainmessageisthatsavingsincreaseassystemsizeincrea ses,whichimplies
that if we move to larger contracts by operator merger (or buyo uts by large
players),wecanexpectincreasesinthecostsofdoingbusines s.Whilethismight
notbedisputed,therebuttalislikelytocomeintermsofnet workeconomieson
thedemandside.Thisiswherewedrawontransactioncostecon omicstoassist,
sinceeveninthepresenceofeconomiesofnetworkintegrityth erearealternative
waysofdeliveringoptimalnetworkperformancewithoutcreating asmallnumberoflargeandrelativelyinefficientcontractareas.
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Summary of the Main Argument

Indeterminingtheappropriatesizeofcontractareas,itisim portanttorecognize
bothinternalefficiencyandexternalbenefitarguments.Intern alefficiencyargumentsrecognizetheimportanceoftheperformanceoftheservicedeliveryentity
regardlessofwhethertheobjectiveiscommercialorsocialobligation.Efficiency
encompassescostefficiency,costeffectiveness,andserviceeffectiveness.External
benefitsfocusprimarilyonaccessibilityand,inparticular,theintegrityofthenetworkandassociatednetworkeconomies.
Inconsideringtheappropriatesizeoftheservicedeliveryuni t(SDU),thecostsof
transactionareveryimportant.Thesecostsarenotlimitedto theinterfirmenvironment (which would include integrated fares and servicing of an interconnectednetwork)butincludethecostsoutlaidwithinafirm.An issueofrelevance
in achieving the efficiency and network benefits is the reveali ng of information
throughappropriatesignals(eitherfromthemarketorbyther egulator)toensurethatthebestinformationisactedupontodeliverservice stothemarketat
costefficientandeffectivelevelsthat,withinasubsidy-depe ndentenvironment,
delivers best value for money (in an efficiency and equity sens e) for the scarce
subsidy dollar.
Looking at the internal efficiency of an SDU, the evidence from the published
literaturesupportstheviewthattherearenoscaleeconomies (over100buses)17
but mild network economies.18 The latter translates in particular into an argument for having fewer (or even one) SDU operating a network-bas ed crossregional service, since the argued benefits to passengers are g reater than if the
cross-regional services were provided by more than one operator. The assumptionimplicitinthisevidenceisthatpassengerswouldhaveto transferbetween
modes(orbusoperators)tocompletetheirjourney.Thesenetwo rkeconomies
arerelativelyweakwherecross-regionalservicesareshownto bedeliverableby
smaller operators who move through other contract areas or wher e, through
contractareaalliancesforspecificroutes,theycanpickupa nddropoffpassengers
anywherealongtheroute.
AgoodexampleinSydneyoftheformeristheprivateoperator,ForestCoaches,
who has a service from St. Ives/Chatswood (20 kms north of the city in a very
wealthyarea)tothecity;agoodexampleofthelatteristhe 35kmorbitalservice
about5kmsoutfromtheCBDinPerth(WesternAustralia)operatedthroughan
allianceofthreeoperators.Thislastexampleisequivalentto whatAdelaide(South
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Australia) would refer to as a route-specific contract across contract areas (see
Appendix2).Creatingamonopolysuppliertodeliverthemildn etworkeconomiesisfalseeconomysinceitwillalmostdefinitelyleadtom ajorlossesininternal
efficiency.Rather,giventheevidencefromtheTransportDataCentre(TDC)ofthe
NSW government that the majority of travel in Sydney occurs loc ally19 (mainly
withinonecontractareabutalsobetweentwoadjacentcontractareas),typically
over80percentofalltrips(oftenwithinasinglecontractar eausingabusservice
locallyortoaccessarailinterchange),theriskofdeliverin ghighlyexpensivelocal
servicestothemajorityofusersjusttosatisfyaclaimonne tworkeconomiesfora
smallamountofpatronageservicedeliveryispooreconomics.I ndeed,encouraging longer trips by any form of transport seems inconsistent wi th a desire to
curtailtravelandpromotemorelocalactivity.
Animportantmessagefromtheinstitutionaleconomicsliteratureisthatweshould
focusonefficiencyandnotmarketpower(theconcernwithredu cingthenumberofcontractareas);andweshouldnotaggregateoperatorso rcontractareas
justtogainnetworkbenefitsinsituationswheremostofthese benefitsarewithin
anexistingcontractareainthemain.Throughrecognitionofm arketopportunities (using appropriate signalling methods to reveal and share information and
hencereduceinformationasymmetry)createdbypartnershipsbet weenalloperatorsandgovernment(viatheregulator),andtheformationofo peratoralliances
toservespecialisedcross-regionalmarketniches,themajortr ansactioncosts(e.g.,
information asymmetry) appear to be more than offset by the hug e gains in
internalefficiencyassociatedwithoperatorswithcontractsinthe30to100fleetsizerange.Importantly,anindividualoperatormayhavemorethanonecontract
(asmanydo),buttherearesensibleargumentstosupportthem aintenanceof
eachcontractasaseparatebusinesscenter.Largeoperations,suchasmanyAsianbasedbusbusinesses(e.g.,inHongKong),mightbenefitbyreviewingtheirstructuresandmayreducethegrowinglevelsofsubsidysupportthat ,inpart,funds
inefficiencies.

Integrated Fares: Regulatory Control and/or Genuine Benefit
to Passengers?
Dopeopleneedtousemorethanonemodeofpublictransport/
operatortousepublictransportasanalternativetothecar?Maybe
thetransfersassociatedwithmulti-modalmovementareamajor
barrierregardlessofwhatfarearrangementsareinplace?
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Integratedfaresareseenasawayofattractingmorepublictr ansportpatronage
becausetheyenableonetopurchaseamultimodaland/ormultiop eratorticketat
one point in time from one source. Although there is initial ap peal in this fare
strategy,thejustificationmustbebasedonanagreedsetofobjectives.Themost
importantmustbeabenefittopassengers(andassociatedflow- throughtooperatorsandthecommunityatlarge).Itisassumedthatoneof thereasonswhy
publictransportisnotusedasmuchasitmightisthepoorin tegrationofservices
across the network. One feature of poor integration is the need  to purchase a
separateticketfromeachoperator,whichisassumedtobemoreexpensivethan
thepurchaseofasinglemultimodal/operatorfarebecauseofth efixed-costcomponent in each ticket. The presumption is that there would be a  single-fixed
componentinanintegratedfare(althoughthisneedstobedemo nstrated).
Overriding the actual fare level is the issue of network integr ity and what this
actuallymeansforpassengergrowthandbenefit.Whatistheev idencethatpassengersactuallywanttotravelbyanumberofpublictransport modesacrossa
networkifthemodeswerebetterintegrated?Whatistheeviden cethatintegrated
faresisthesolution(orevenasignificantcontributor)?Thecounterfactualswould

havetoshowthatimprovedintegration,onwhatevercriteriaareadopted,would
indeedshowmovementsbetweenmodesandoperatorsthatarecurrentlynotable
tobeundertaken.Theopportunityforsuchtraveldoesexistinmostcities(at least

tosomeextent)intermsofservicesavailable,butisitwhat peoplewant?Sucha
systemleadstotransfersandwithgreaterdominanceofafewo peratorsthereisa
realriskonhubbingwherebytransfersbecomeanegativefeatur e.Theevidencein
Appendix 1 from around the world initially looks compelling, bu t it must be
interpreted very carefully. What exactly are we seeingsome sort of discount
disguised through integrated fares and/or genuine contributions  to improving
mobilityacrossthenetwork?
Toillustratethismatter,Table2showstheyear2000evidenceonpublictransport
useinSydneyinvolvingmorethanonepublicmode.Theuseofm ultiplepublic
modesin2000is17.4percent.Thistabledistinguishesthenum beroftimesina
tripthataspecificmodeisused.Ofparticularinterestisth euseofmorethanone
bus for a one-way trip. Out of a total of 1.29 million daily pa ssenger trips that
involve at least one public mode in a trip chain, 2.861 percent  of all trips (i.e.,
36,982 trips) involve two or more buses. It might be argued tha t switching between buses highlights a downside of services that is better de livered through
single-vehiclecross-regionalservices.Thegreateramountoft hemultiple-bustrips
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are on government buses (31,508 or 85.2%) operating close to th e CBD, which
maysaysomethingpositiveabouttheabilitytotravelbeyondc ontractareasby
busalthoughitsayssomethingnegativeinrespectoftherequi rementtohaveto
transfer.20

Table 2. Average Day Linked Trips Involving at Least
One Public Transport Mode, HTS2000
PublicBus
Ferry

PrivateBus

Train

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

0

0

3

0

0

4

0

1

0

0

1

2

3

4

Total

338,364

28,065

1,396

346

368,171

446,502

72,852

3,229

34,132

2,868

197

235

2,739

571

522,583

214

37,432
3,524

428

428

267,790

2,372

270,162

0

1

1

45,883

2,605

48,488

0

1

2

1,926

365

2,291

0

2

0

6,688

0

2

1

2,471

0

3

0

1,397

6,688
132

2,603

1,397

1

0

0

15,281

5,166

1

0

1

2,574

1,044

1

0

2

1,252

1

1

0

634

1

1

1

375

2

0

0

1,055

1,070

21,517
3,618
1,252

234

868
375

159

1,214

Note:Dataincludestripsthatmayhaveusedother(non-T)modes.Theothermodesareignored;
thereforeonepublicbusmaymeanonepublicbusonlyoronepublicbuspluscar.
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Interconnectivity involving more than one bus operator in Sydne y is negligible
(evenifonearguesthisisduetorelativelypoorexistingint erconnectivity)andis
unlikelytobeofconcerntomostofthetravelingpopulation. Whileitmightbe
arguedthatthenatureoftheexistingnetworkofservicesdeni esthisopportunity
(andcertainlythecounterfactualsarenotavailable),ifsuch networkconnectivity
weretobeprovidedandwouldincreasepatronage,theissueof relevancehereis
whethercross-regionalandlong-haulmetropolitanservicescan beachievedunderexistingareacontractsbyappropriateallianceswhichpreservetheefficiencies
ofeachoperator(includingtransactioncostadvantages).
Therecentgrowthincross-regionalservicesinSydneybypriva teoperatorswithouttransfersdemonstratesoneusefulcounter-factualinwhichapassengercan
travel on a single-mode/single-operator service without transfe rs over long distanceswithintheSydneyMetropolitanarea(to/fromtheCBDwhi chisnotowned
byasinglecontractandanopen-accessservicezone).ExamplesincludetheWestbus
M2andHillsservices(inthenorthwest),HarrisParkCitybus( fromParramattain
thewest),andForestCoachesSt.Ives/Chatswood-Cityservice( inthenorth),allof
which serve the outer suburbs and deliver passengers into the C BD (see Figure
1).21SimilarexamplesexistfortheSTAexceptthatmanyoftheSTAservicesare
acrosscontractareasbelongingtotheSTAenablingpickupanddropoffacross
the contract areas (although one might argue that strictly this  is violating the
termsofacontract).Theneedforintegratedfaresintheseex amples(wherepublic
transport is showing evidence of serious competition with the c ar) is not relevant.22
Integratedfaresareaformofregulatoryinterventionifimpos edonalloperators
fromabovesinceallmustconformtothegrandplan.AsHibbs( 2000)hasindicated,constructsofintegration(ofwhichintegratedfaresare anexample)leadto
aweakeningofbotheffectivenessandefficiency.Itdeniesindividualoperatorsor
groupsofoperatorsthefullabilitytoberesponsivetomarket opportunitiesin
ways that are consistent with delivering the appropriate servic es to customers.
Again,Hibbsandothersarguethatotherthantheregardforsa fetyandissuesof
scale and power, public passenger transport is a market-based, customer-driver
activity and especially with regard to its relationship with the private car, from
wheremostofitscompetitioncomes.Integratedfaresdictated acrosstheboard
maywellbeinequitableaswellasaninefficientwayofsecuri ngoptimumsocial
benefit.23 Market-based fares policies designed to benefit users are need ed, and
thebesttestofthisisthelevelsofpatronageresultingfromthepolicy.Ifaspecific
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arrangementoralliancebetweenoperatorsinaparticularpubli ctransportchain
seesmeritinintegratedfares,thenthisshouldbesupported, butnotasacarte
blanche,no-choicepolicy.Theone-size-fits-allphilosophyisverydangerousand
counterproductive.
What Is the Broader Evidence on Patronage Benefits?

Thematterofintegratedfaresandimpactsonpatronageisnotwellstudied.There
arevirtuallynopublishedpapersonthetopicthatmaketheli nkclearandunambiguous.Thatis,unlessonecanseparateoutalltheothercha ngesthatarehappeningatthesametime(e.g.,farediscounting),24itisnotpossibletomakeany
sensible statements on the specific contribution of integrated/ intermodal/
interoperator fares.
Inreviewingtheliteraturewehavefoundanumberofcomments thatstatethat
intermodal fares are often inappropriate where one has mainly m ode-specific
travel.Thatis,mostcircumstanceswherethetopicismentioned,talkaboutlimitedmodalswitching(i.e.,railtobus)andfocusonsingle-mo dediscountedfares
andotherdeals(includingthegrowinginterestinmultipurpose faremediathat
enableonetouseasmartcardonbuses,shopping,cinemas).The examplesnever
refertosmartcardsfortravelingonbusesandtrains,whichis interestingbyits
absence.
ThestudiesinAppendix1arebasedonaliteraturereviewbyB oozAllanHamilton
(BAH)in2002.Mostarequestionable.Forexample,oneoftheb etterstudiesby
London Transport (Fairhurst 1993) found that the introduction of Travelcards
boostedpassengermilesinthefirstyearby3.83percentisba sedonveryaggregatedtimeseriesdata.Wequestionwhatothercontrolvariableswereincluded.
ThepaperbyFooteandDarwin(2001)forChicagoconcludesthat a3.6percent
increaseinridershipoverayearwhenAFCwasintroducedisattributedtomany
factorsbutmostisattributedtofarepolicieswithinasingle mode(whichismore
reflectiveofwherethemarketis).Theoverallgrowthimpact( i.e.,newtrips)ofall
sources of fare changes is maximally 30 percent of 3.6 percent or 1.08 percent.
Clearlymuchlessthan10percentsuggestedbytheBAHreview.25
TheDutchrail-taxicombinationintroducedin2000isanothere xampleofintegration of two modes. One cannot infer anything about patronage  growth
because the new taxi services provided were rather different from those of the
ordinarytaxis.Thetrain-taxishavealowerqualityofservice .Withmorepassengers
per taxi, one may have to wait at the railway station. Another example is the
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introductionofthestandardizednationwidebus/tram/metrotick etintheNetherlandsinthe1970s,enablingpassengerstousethesameticke tirrespectiveofthe
modeorthecompanyprovidingtheservices.Nomonitoringwasu ndertakenon
theeffectsofitsintroductionatthattime.Suchchangestendnotonlytoencourageintegrationbutalsoproduceadifferentpricestructure.

Conclusions
Theargumentsandevidencepresentedinthisarticlesuggestth attheperceived
gainsfromthereductioninthenumberofcontractareasarelikelytobeillusory.
Ifthegainsinnetworkeconomiesarenotsufficientlylargeto outweighanylikely
lossofinternalefficiency,thereisacaseforamalgamatingcontractareastoensure
thatlocalservicesarenothamperedbycross-contractareacon straintsonservice
delivery.Giventhemajorfocusonlocalserviceprovision,opportunitiestodeliver
appropriatecross-regionalandcross-networkservicescanberevealedandpromotedbypartnershipsbetweenbusoperatorsandtheregulator.
Amechanismbywhichtheappropriatemarketsignalsarecapture dandmade
availabletoallrelevantparties(i.e.,thereleaseofinforma tion)isrequired.Integrated fares as one instrument to promote network public transp ort activity,
whilehavingsomemerit,areunlikelytobeamajorinfluenceo nthetake-uprate
ofcross-regionalnetworkservicessincetheyarebestsupplied asasinglemodal
service through an alliance or agreement for a single operator to deliver crosscontractroute-specificserviceswheretransfersareminimised ifnoteliminated.
Thenandonlythenmightwehaveachanceoftakingsometraffi cfromthecar
market.
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Appendix 1. Impact of Fares and Ticketing Integration
on Patronage International Case Studies
Source:BoozAllanHamiltonReview2002

London
As part of a number of initiatives to increase public transport  use, multimodal
Travelcardswereintroducedforbusandundergroundservicesduringearly1983.
RailwaslaterincludedintheschemewiththemergingofTravelcardandCapitalcard
during1989.Fairhurst(1993)soughttoseparatelyisolatepatr onageimpactsfrom
changesinfaresandfaresintegration.Thefirstyearimpactf romfaresintegration
was significant with passenger miles increasing around 18 perce nt on buses, 28
percentonundergroundservices,and24percentoverall.

Paris
Inmid1975,theOrangeCardwasintroducedintheParisregi on.Thecardisa
nontransferable,monthly(oryearly)seasonticketthatcanbe usedondifferent
transportmodesincludingbus,themetro,suburbantrain,andv ariousoperator
networks(i.e.,RER,SNCF,APTR).TheOrangeCardhashadasignificanteffecton
patronagealthoughtheimpactsonbusandmetroserviceshavebeendisproportionate.

NewYork
AmajorchangeinticketingoccurredinNewYorkduring1997withtheintroductionoftheMetroCard.Astoredvaluecard,theMetroCardcanbeusedonthe
busandthesubwayandisacceptedbyalloperators.TheMetroC ardhadasignificant effect on patronage, particularly buses. Between July 1996  and July 1997,
averageweekdaybusridershipincreased16.9percentandaverag eweekendbus
ridershipincreased20.2percent.Theeffectsonthesubwaywer elessmarked,with
weekdaysubwayridershipincreasingby2.6percent.Overallrid ershiplevelswere
attheirhighestsince1971(Walker1997).

Zurich
Priortotheintroductionofintegratedticketing,Zurichwasc haracterizedbyan
exceptionallyhighlevelofpublictransportuse.Scheduleswer ecoordinatedona
voluntarybasiswitheachoperatorhavingitsownfares.
After the formation of the Zurcher Verkenrsverbund (ZVV), a comprehensive
integratedfareandticketingsystemwasintroduced.Thisinvol vedthefullcoordi32
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nationofservicesandthedevelopmentofasinglefaresystembasedonzonalfares.
Thecombinationofthesetwofactorsincreasedoverallpatronag ebyanaverage
12 percent in the first twp years of operation, with significan t increases of 53
percentand30percentforfeederbusesandheavyrailrespecti vely(Laube1995).

Surrey
SurreyCountyCouncilhasmadesignificantinvestmentsinsever alpublictransportschemesincludingtheTravelwideticketinWoking.Usersurveyswereconductedtoevaluatetheperformanceofsuchschemes.Surveysrev ealedthatthe
Travelwide ticket had little effect on patronage in terms of take-up by existing
users(i.e.,lessthan2%ofbususershadusedtheTravelwideticket).TheTravelwide
tickethadlimitedsuccessingeneratingnewbusjourneys.Overall,thestudyconcludedthatthemultiplejourneyTravelwidetickethadanegligibleeffectonpatronage (unknown author).

LosAngeles
Interoperatortransfersaccountedforlessthan0.5percentoftotalregionalrides
priortothegrowthoffaresandserviceintegration.Asservic eandfaresintegration grew, the number of passengers making multioperator trips increased. By
1994thenumberofmultioperatortripshadincreased2percent (i.e.,11million
boardingsperyear)(CarterandPollen1994).

Chicago
AChicagostudyestimatedthatridershipwouldincreasebetween 2to5percent
as a result of the introduction of automated fare collection sy stems (Dinning
1996).

WestMidlands
Oneofthefirstmajorexamplesof integratedticketing in Britain wasthe West
MidlandsTravelcardschemeintroducedin1972.Asresultoftheschemeitwas
estimated that 7 percent more trips were being made by 1981 (Wh ite and
Brocklebank 1994).\

Singapore
During 1991 to 1992, the Farecard system in Singapore increas ed passenger
numbersby2.5percent.Giventheincreasesinfarelevels,thi soutcomewasnot
anticipated(BaggaleyandFongChoonKhin1994).
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Appendix 2. Contract Area Size: The Adelaide View
Source:TomWilson,PassengerTransportBoard,Adelaide
OurlimitedexperienceinAdelaidewasthatthereseemedtobelittleinterestfrom
tenderers in contracts with less than 30 buses (e.g., the Outer NE Transit Link
Contract for 25 buses). Of course, there are many arguments abo ut bus depot
size,butalargecontractcaneasilyhaveanumberofdepots.
Assomeonewholargelydesignedtheshape/size/boundariesofou rAdelaidecontracts,Iwouldsuggestthatthemostimportantissuesare:
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Closelyexaminingthestructureoftheexistingroutenetworkt oseehow
itfitstogether,andlocatethenaturalbreaksandboundaries



Examining geographic boundaries



Examining passenger travel patterns as well as having a knowled ge of
nonpublictransport(butpotential)travelpatterns



Asthemainall-daypublictransportpassengerflowsinAustral iansuburbs
areprimarilytotheCityandtomajorregional/districtcenters,thesecenters(andmajorinterchangepoints)shouldformthefocuspoint sofcontractareas.Theycaneitherbeinthecenterofthem,sothec ontractarea
surrounds and focuses on them, or on the boundaries of two or m ore
contract areas, so that each adjacent contract area can focus o n those
centers.Thetradeareasofthesecentersisanimportanteleme ntincontractareadesign



Allowingcross-boundaryservicestocontinue,andensuringthat newcross
boundaryservicescanbeimplementedbywritingtheirpossibili tyintothe
contracts. Cross boundary services should generally be allocate d to the
contractareawithinwhichmostoftheroutefalls



Alternatively,verylongcrossboundaryroutescouldbetreatedasseparate
routecontracts,providingasignificantnumberofbusesisi nvolved



Small route groups that do not comply with all of the above sho uld be
amalgamatedwiththelargerareacontractstoallowflexibilityinnetwork
planning.Theycouldberetainedifnecessarywheretheyserve anisolated
area(e.g.,asuburbanareaononeofSydneysmanypeninsulascouldhave
itsowncontractwithoutimpactingonflexibility)
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Endnotes
Readers unfamiliar with the details of competitive tendering wi ll find a useful
summaryinHensherandBrewer(2001:2734.)
1

Integratedfaresisnotthesameasintegratedticketing.The latterreferstothe
technologicalplatformwithinwhichoperatorsprovideelectronictickets.
2

SeeNote1.

3

SeeNote2.

4

Althoughnotthefocusofthisarticle,animportantissueist hemechanismfor
distributing the fare revenue to the transport suppliers, compl icated in some
jurisdictionsbytheabsenceofaflagfallcomponentofabu sfareforeachlegof
atrip(i.e.,afixedoverheadchargepertripregardlessofdi stancetraveled).
5

6

AustralasiaincludesAustraliaandNewZealand.

Animportantdistinctionismadebetweencontract/operatorare asthatarea
singlerouteincontrasttoageographicalarea.Thedistinctio nappearsprimarilya
matterofsharedresourcessuchasdepotsandcoordinatedtimet abling.Areview
oftheliteraturefailedtofindasinglepaperaddressingthis issue.
7

Althoughthefirmsizeliteratureincludesdirectcompetition betweenfirms,it
alsorecognisessituationsinwhichfirmsoperateasspatialmo nopoliesasisthe
situationwithbusoperatorswhodonotcompeteinthemarket( eventhough
theycompetewiththecar).

8

Thequestionnotaddressedintheliteratureonbusprovisioni stheextentto
whichinnovativeopportunitiesaregreaterunderregimeswhichlessenthepower
oftheregulatorindeliveryofservices.Itmaybethecaseth attheempiricalevidence,aslimitedasitis,ismisleadingbecauseofthefailur eofincentivestructures
todeliverthegainswhichareinherentinalessconstrainedmarket.Weneedto
understandthecircumstancesunderwhichincentivescanevolveandbeeffective.
Oneproblemwiththebusindustrymaybethatthelackofexper ienceinmanagingchangeand/orthereticenceinbeinginnovativegivenahis toryofsuppression
of innovation is hampering the speed of taking up opportunities  waiting for
action.Generationalinheritance,forexample,whichoftenlack sanunderstandingoftheneedtosustainwealthandsurvivalleadstoareductioninentrepreneurialactivityandhenceadeclineinanypotentialinnovation.
9
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The winners curse exists when the winning operator discovers after winning
thatithasoverpaidgiventherealvalueofthetender.

10

11

Allcostsarein$AUD,with$AUD1.0approximatelyequalto$U.S.0.59.

Theinternalefficiencyofanorganizationdependsonthedegre eofcompetition
itfacesinsofarascompetitionaffectsmanagerialincentives andopportunities.
Onewaythatcompetitionsharpensincentives,andhenceinternalefficiency,isby
permitting the relative performance of agents to be compared. B enchmarking
runstherealriskofbeinglostwithaveryfewoperators.
12

InOslothereiscurrentlydiscussionaboutthecontractsizef orthefuturebus
tenders.Theauthorityhasclearlystatedthatoperatorsshould begivenfinancial
incentives for passenger growth and service quality, and performance contract
principles should be applied. The problem here is that there ar e two principalagentrelationships.Firstly,therewillbeacontractbetweenthecityandthemunicipal company (Oslo Sporveier) that serves as the public tran sport executive
(PTE).Thiswillbeanetwork-widenetcontractthatwillnotb etendered.Previously,thisrelationwassubjecttoaperformance-basedsubsidy,butthishasbeen
discontinued.Secondly,therewillbetenderedsubcontractsforvariouspackages.
Thesearethecontractsforwhichperformance-basedprinciples willbeapplied.
(Bothnetandgrosscontractsarecurrentlyinusefortheseop erations,buttenderinghasnotyetcommenced.)Toensureasufficientnumberofcompetitors,it
isexpectedthatthePTEwillwanttorestrictthesizeofcontractareas.Inpractice
thiswillmeanthatthetenderpackageswillconsistofasmall numberofroutes.
TheOslonetworkiscomplexandroutescrisscrossalloverthecity.Consequently,
itmaybedifficulttoimplementnet-costcontracts,atleastwithoutasophisticatedrevenueallocationsystem.Thealternativeisagross-cos tsystemwithquality
incentives,butthatissomethingdifferentfromtheHordaland typemodel,which
requiresanet-costcontract.
13

Althoughnotspecificallyrelatedtonumberofoperators,thei ssueofwhoowns
whatisveryimportantindeterminingeconomicefficiencyinservicedelivery.Operatingfranchises,suchasthoseinAdelaidethatseparateinvestmentfromoperatingdecisions,areboundtoresultinresourcemisallocation,manifestedbyovercapitalization and the production of dispensable and underutili zed services
(Berechman 1993:294). Apart from the diverse goals of the owner  of the assets
(i.e.,publicsector)whopromotesocialwelfareoutcomesinco ntrasttothecommercialoutcomesoftheoperator,thegovernmentandoperatordisproportion14
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atelysharetheoverallrisksincethebulkoftheriskassocia tedwithcapitalinvestment(notablythefleet)isassumedbygovernment.Withtheris kofovercapitalizationgreaterthanundersingleownership(andasinglecomme rcialobjective),
thelossofeconomicefficiencyisveryreal,exacerbatedifth eoperatorengagesin
higherriskprojectsthanitwouldotherwisedosoifitcarrie dthefullrisk.Thisrisk
can, in part, be circumvented by monitoring but at a much highe r level that
wouldberequirediftheoperatorcarriedalltherisk.Itisd oubtfulthatthegovernment would be able to acquire all the necessary information on costs and
demandwithoutoutlayingalotofresources.Transactionscostsarelikelytoraise
questionsaboutthevalueofthisapproachtoservicedelivery.Underrisk-sharing
thenotionthatbiddersareexpectedtobeartheentireriskst emmingfrominvestmentandoperationaldecisions,withthefacevalueoftheirbi dsservingasasound
predictoroftheirexpectedperformance,evaporates.
Ifcostsofhavingaprivatefirmsupplytheservicescouldbe reducedbymeans
ofanegotiatedcontract,theconsiderablecostsoforganizing acompetitivebiddingwouldbeaverted.Indeed acompetitivetenderingschemem ightinsome
cases be inferior to methods of contract renewal or negotiation (Berechman,
1993, 29899)
15

 Within the Sydney metropolitan area, private bus operators are  some of the
mostcostefficientintheworld.Consequently,competitivetenderingisveryunlikelytodeliverfinancialbenefit.

16

Thereisacaseforeconomiesofscaleinmovingfromaverysm alloperationsuch
as1to4busesuptoabout30buses,butovertherange30to 100weseealmost
constant returns to scale with decreasing returns to scale over  100 buses
(Berechman1993andpersonalcommunication(July11,2002)withKjellJansson,
Sweden). Fleet size is an appropriate indicator of scale, being  highly correlated
withothercontenderssuchaspopulationpersquarekilometer( acorrelationof
0.886fortheSTAcontractareas).Otherindicatorssuchasarea(insqkms)hasa
simplecorrelationof0.80forSTAareas.

17

TheSydney2000Olympicsprovidedvaluableevidenceonthisma tter(Hensher
andBrewer2003).Thedepotsetuptocoordinatebusservicesa ccommodated
morethan1,000buses,substantiallylargerthanthelargestde potinSydneyunder
normalconditions(anSTAdepotwith250buses).Inhindsight,itwasconcluded
that major internal efficiencies could have been obtained by ha ving a series of
smallerdepotsupto150buses.
18
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19

Wewouldarguethatthisiscommoninmostlargemetropolitanareas.

20. ResearchbyAlsnihandHensher(2003)suggeststhatseniorsand theelderly
(i.e.,individualsover55yearsold)arelessinclinedtouse publictransportwhere
transfersarerequired.
Examplesofcross-regionalservicesinthetextareveryweakb ecausetheydonot
involvepickingupanddroppingoffinmorethanonecontracta rea.(TheCBDof
Sydneyisnotacontractarea.)Thisabilitydoesnotexistamo ngprivateoperators
inSydneybecauseoftheexistingcontractrequirements.Itis suggestedthatthe
governmentoperator(StateTransit)hastruecross-regionalservicessuchasRoute
400(BurwoodtoBondiJunction),Route370(CoogeetoLeichhard t),andRoute
L20(CitytoParramatta).Privateoperatorshavenottodatede velopedstrategic
alliancestopickupanddropoffinmorethanoneoperatorsarea,denyingthemselvesofalliancerevenue.

21

 Althoughtheautomated fare collection (AFC) system of theSTA shows that
one in five boardings is made by a Travelpass ticket of which 66 percent are a
train+bus+ferryticketand32percentareabus-ferryticket(w ithonly3%being
busonly),itisunclearastowhethertheticketpurchaseract uallyusesmorethan
onemodeorissimplytakingadvantageoftheattractivediscou ntsoffered.For
example,theaveragediscountonTravelpassesisbetween27and 36percent.

22

Theinequityislikelytoarisefromcross-subsidytotherelat ivelywealthiertravelerswhotendtoundertakethelongertrips.
23

The introduction of integrated fares is often in conjunction wi th other measures,suchasincreasedmarketingbudgetstopushthenewtick etingandpromoting bus travel, better information systems, increased bus fr equencies and
discountstofares.Increaseddiscountingwouldbeafeatureof manyintegrated
ticketingexercisesandwouldhaveanimpactonridership.
24

Onerefereesuggested,Theappendicesdefinitelydemonstratei ncreasedridershipincasesoffareintegration.Whilenotdenyingtheabsoluteevidence,thetext
arguesthatthecontributionoffareintegrationtothepatrona geincreasesisby
nomeansclearandthatotherfactorshaveplayedarole.Wesu pportamuchmore
carefullyconstructedempiricalstudytoestablishthewidersetofinfluenceson
patronageincreasesratherthancredititalltofaresintegrat ion.

25
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Pupil Fatalities
on Public Transit Buses:
A Comparison with School Buses
LidiaP.Kostyniuk
UniversityofMichigan,TransportationResearchInstitute

Abstract
Fatalityratesofschool-agechildrenontripsto/fromschoolb ytransitbuses(while
passengersorpedestriansapproachingorleavingthebus)were estimatedfrom
existing data and compared with school-bus-related fatality rat es.  Data from
FARS19961998wereusedtoidentifydeathsofschool-agebuspassengersand
pedestriansinallcrashesduringtimesthatchildrennormallytravelto/fromschool.
Policecrashreportswereobtainedforthepedestriandeathsan dreviewedforbus
involvement and identification of the trip as one to/from schoo l.  The average
numberofpupilskilledonsuchtripsontransitbusesintheU nitedStateswas0.3
deathsperyear,andpossiblyashighas1.7deathsperyear.UsingNPTSdatato
control for exposure, a fatality rate of four deaths per billio n pupil trips (95%
confidenceintervalof111)wasestimated.Withintheprecisio nachievablewith
availabledata,norecognizabledifferencebetweenpupilfatali tyratesbytransit
busesandschoolbuseswasfound.

Introduction
Thereareapproximately57millionchildren,age518,intheUnitedStates(U.S.
CensusBureau,2001)andmostofthemarepupilsinkindergarte nthrough12th
grade(K-12).About23.5millionofthesechildrentraveltoandfromschoolon
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school buses,1 operated or contracted by schools or school districts [National
HighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration(NHTSA)2001a].Inmanystates,thereisno
legalmandatetoprovidepupilswithtransportationservicesan dbecauseofother
fundingprioritiesandlimitedbudgets,someschoolsandschool districtslookto
publictransitbusesasanalternativetoschoolbuses.Indeed, manyurbanpublic
transportationsystemshavespecialfaresforstudents,andadj usttheirschedules
and routes to meet the demand for trips to and from school. The  number of
children who travel to and from school on common carrier buses operated by
publictransitagenciesisnotknown,butwasreportedin1996 tobeabouttwo
million(NationalAssociationofStateDirectorsofPublicTransportationServices
1996).Althoughthenumberoffatalitiesandinjuriesonpublic transitsystemsis
verylow(e.g.,seeNHTSA2001b),mostridersareadults,andc ommunitiesconsideringpublictransitforpupiltransportationhavequestionsaboutthesafetyof
childrentravelingonthesebuses.Periodically,atragicdeathofachildontheway
toorfromschoolbypublictransitbusintensifiesthesequest ions(e.g.,National
TransportationSafetyBoard1997).
Childrentravelingeitherbyschoolbusortransitbusareexpo sedtorisksofinjury
ordeathaspassengersonthebusaswellaspedestriansapproa chingorleavingthe
bus. There are, however, more measures to reduce these risks for children on
schoolbusesthanforchildrenonpublictransitbuses.Forexa mple,manyofthe
FederalMotorCarrierSafetyStandards(FMCSS)thatapplytobu seshaveadditionalrequirementsforschoolbuses,includingoutsidemirrors thatallowaseated
driver to see along both sides of the bus, amber and red warnin g lights for use
whenloadingandunloadingpassengers,emergencyexits,andspe cialfuelsystem
requirements. In addition, four FMCSS are unique to school buse s, including
minimum structural strength for rollover protection, bus body j oint strength,
high-backedandwell-paddedpassengerseats,andapedestrians afetysystemconsistingofastopsignalarmtoprotectpupilsinthebusloadi ngandunloadingarea
(CodeofFederalRegulations49CFR571.3,2002).Furthermore, trafficlawsofall
50statesandtheDistrictofColumbiarequiremotoriststosto pwhentheyencounteraschoolbusthatisloadingorunloadingchildren(Ham ada1999).There
arenosimilartrafficrulesforpublictransitvehicles.
Althoughtheextrasafetyprecautionsassociatedwithschoolbu sesseemtoindicategreatersafetyontheschoolbussystem,acomparisonoft heratesoffatalities
and injuries sustained by children on the way to and from schoo l by both bus
systems would provide a more definitive answer to the question about pupil
44
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safetyonpublictransitbussystems.Adirectcomparisonofsuchrates,however,is
challengingbecausetheinformationavailablefromnationalveh iclecrashdatabasesisnotsufficienttoperformthenecessarystatisticalan alysis,soindirectmethods must be identified and used. Furthermore, some indirect met hods may be
suitableforestimatingfatalitiesbutnotinjuries,thuscalli ngforseparateapproaches
andanalyses.
Thisarticleexploresthedifferentialeffectsonsafetyofchi ldrentravelingtoand
fromschool(henceforthcalledschooltrips)bypublictransit busesandbyschool
buses. The objectives are (1) to obtain on a nationwide basis, comparable estimatesoffatalityrates2ofpupilsonschooltripsbythesetwomodesusingexisting
datasources,and(2)toidentifytheshortcomingsanduncertai ntiesthatcome
fromusingthesedata.Themeasuresselectedforassessingsafe tyofschooltripsare
the numbers and rates of fatalities sustained by pupils as pass engers on public
transitbusesandschoolbuses,andaspedestrianswhenapproac hingorleaving
eithertypeofbus.Pedestrianfatalitiesincludethosewithdi rectandindirectinvolvementofthebus,withdirectinvolvementincludingcasesi nwhichthevictim
was struck by the bus that he or she was approaching or leaving , and indirect
involvementincludingcasesinwhichthechildwasstruckbya vehicleotherthan
the bus.
Therestofthisarticleisorganizedasfollows.Potentialdat asourcesforfatalitiesof
childrenonschooltripsonpublictransitvehiclesandschool busesareassessedin
thenextsection.Measuresanddatasourcesofexposureareexa minedinthethird
section.Methodsusedforestimatingthenumbersandratesofp upilfatalitieson
schooltripsaredescribedinthefourthsection.Resultsarep resentedinthefifth
section.Theoverallfindingsarediscussedinthelastsection.

Data Sources
Thefirststepinthisstudywastoidentifydatasourcesthat recordfatalcrashes
involvingpupilsonschooltrips.Ideally,suchsourceswouldidentifythevictimas
apupil,thetripasaschooltrip,andthevehicleasaschool busorpublictransit
bus.Suchinformationshouldbeavailableforbus-relatedcrash esinvolvingother
vehiclesaswellaspedestrians.
Forfatalcrashes,theFatalityAnalysisReportingSystem(FARS;NHTSA,1999a)is
themostcompletedatabase,coveringallfatalmotorvehicletr afficcrashesnationwide and subject to thorough quality controls. FARS has detailed vehicle-body
codes that allow clear differentiation of school buses and publ ic transit buses.
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FARSalsohasaspecialcodetoindicatethataschoolbuswasinvolvedinacrash.
Crashesinvolvingschoolbuseswithothervehiclesorwithpede striansarecoded
asschool-busrelated.Pedestriancrashesinwhichachildwas struckbyanother
vehiclewhileapproachingorleavingtheschoolbusarealsoco dedasschool-bus
related,ifthelightsontheschoolbuswereflashing.Casesi nwhichthevictimwas
apassengeronapublictransitbusorwasstruckbythebusca nbeeasilyidentified
inFARS,buttherearenocodestoidentifyavictimasapupilonaschooltrip.
Therearealsonoelementsforcodingtheindirectinvolvement ofpublictransit
busesinanypedestriancrash.Itisfeasibletoidentifyvicti msaspossiblepupilsby
determiningifthevictimwasofschoolage,andifthecrasho ccurredatthetimea
childwouldbetravelingtoorfromschool,butthereisnoway ofassessingwhether
apublictransitbuswasindirectlyinvolved.
Otherelectronicdatasourceswereexaminedtodetermineifthe ycontainedinformationaboutindirectinvolvementofpublictransitbusesin pedestriandeaths
orifvictimscouldbeidentifiedaspupilsonaschooltrip.A mongthedatasystems
examinedwere:theNationalAccidentSamplingSystem(NASS)Gen eralEstimates
System (NHTSA 1999b), NASS System Crashworthiness Data System ( NHTSA
1998),NASSPedestrianCrashDataStudy(NHTSA1997),CrashOut comeData
EvaluationSystem(NHTSA1996a,theNationalTransitDatabase(FederalTransit
Administration 1999) and state crash data files (NHTSA 1999c). None of these
data sources could provide information on the indirect involvem ent of public
transitbusesinpedestriancrashes.WiththeexceptionofColoradosstatecrash
data,whichhasaprovisionforidentifyingavictimasachild onaschooltrip,none
ofthedatasourcescouldidentifyavictimasapupilonasch ooltrip.
Severalnonelectronicdatasourceswerealsoconsideredincludi ngannualnational
surveysofschoolbusloadingandunloadingaccidentspublished bytheKansas
StateDepartmentofEducation(KSDOE1996,1997,1998,1999)and originalhardcopypolicecrashreports(PCRs).TheKSDOEreportscontainmuchinformation
aboutdirectandindirectinvolvementofschoolbuses,butprov idelittleinformation about public transit bus crashes. The PCRs (from which ele ctronic crash
records are coded) include narratives, crash diagrams, witness statements, and
otherinformationaboutthecrash.Thus,additionalinformation aboutcasesin
FARSelectronicdatacanbefoundinthesePCRsandmayprovideenoughinformation to determine if a child was on a school trip, and also t o determine if a
publictransitbuswasindirectlyinvolved.
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The most promising source for comparing fatalities on public transit buses to
thoseonschoolbusesappearstobeacombinationofFARSelectronicdataand
PCRmaterials.Fatalcrashesinvolvingpupilpassengersonscho olbusesandpupil
pedestrians, whether they were struck by the school bus or by a nother vehicle
when approaching or leaving the school bus, can be obtained from FARS electronicdata.Casesinwhichvictimswereschool-agepassengers ofpublictransit
busesorschool-agepedestriansstruckbypublictransitbuses canalsobeidentified directly from FARS electronic data. Indirect involvement of public transit
busesinpupilfatalitiesmaybedeterminedthroughthereview ofhard-copyPCRs
ofcasesidentifiedbyscreeningFARSdata.Becauseindirectinvolvementofabusin
a crash occurs when a pedestrian, approaching or leaving the bu s, is struck by
anothervehicle,thesetofallvehicularcrashesinvolvingped estriansofschoolage
thatoccurredatthetimethatchildrenregularlytraveltoand fromschoolshould
alsocontainthosecasesinwhichpublictransitbuseswereind irectlyinvolved.

Exposure
Measures

Tocalculateratesofcrashesinvolvingpupilsonschooltrips,asuitablemeasureof
exposurehadtobeselected.Thiswasdonebyexaminingthetyp esofriskspupils
are exposed to on school trips by bus, the measures of these ri sks, the relative
magnitudeoftheserisks,andtheavailabilityofmeaningfulda ta.
Childrenonschooltripsbybusareexposedtotheriskoftwo typesofcrashes:the
riskofacrashwhiletheyarepassengersonthebusandtheri skofbeingstruckby
thebusoranothervehiclewhentheyareapproachingorleaving thebus.Pupilmilesoftravelisanappropriateexposuremeasureforthefirs ttypeofcrash.Crashes
ofthesecondkindcanoccuronlyattwopointsduringeachtri p;thatis,whenthe
pupilgetsonoroffthevehicle.Thus,thenumberofpupiltri psisanappropriate
exposuremeasureforthesecondtypeofcrash.
NHTSA(1999d)reportsthatinschool-bus-relatedcrashes,three timesasmany
pedestriansaspassengersarekilled.Becausetheoverallnumbe roffatalitiesaboard
publictransitbusesissmall,thenumberofpupilfatalitieso nboardtransitbuses
isalsosmall.Therefore,itisplausibletoexpectthattheri sktochildrenisgreater
whentheyareapproachingandleavingapublictransitbusthan whentheyare
passengersonthatbus.Furthermore,estimatingpupil-milesof travelwouldinvolveestimatingdistributionsofthepupil-triplengthsandpu pilbusoccupancies
overbusroutes,andanyproxyforpupil-mileswouldatbestbe acrudeapproxi47
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mation.Thesechallengesledtotheselectionofpupiltripsas thesingleexposure
measureforthisstudy.
Exposure Data

SchoolbusridershipbystateisavailablefromtheNationalAs sociationofState
DirectorsofPupilTransportationServices(BobbittPublications2002).Thechallengeinthisstudywastofindasourceofcomparablepupilri dershiponpublic
transitsystems.SeveralsourceswereexaminedincludingtheNationalTransitDatabase (Federal Transit Administration 1999), American Public Transportation
Association(APTA),publictransitsystems,andtheNationalPersonalTravelSurvey(NPTS;ResearchTriangleInstituteandFederalHighwayAdministration1997).
TheNationalTransitDatabasedoesnothavestudentridershipnordoesitdistinguish riders by age. APTA does not routinely collect student ridership information. While many public transit agencies collect student riders hip data, several
werecontactedandindicatedthattheirlegaldepartmentswould notallowthem
toprovidedataforthisstudy.
TheNPTSisthenationaldatabaseoftravelpatternsandcanbe usedtoestimate
tripsbyagegroupbypurposebymodes,includingthenumberof schooltripsby
variousmodes.ThelatestavailableNPTSdataatthetimeofth isstudywerefrom
1995.Thereareseveralproblems,however,withusingNPTSdatatoestimatethe
number of pupil trips on public transit buses. One problem is t hat NPTS has
codes for three types of buses: intercity bus, school bus, and bus. This distinguishes school buses from other buses, but does not distinguish  public transit
busesfromothertypesofbuses.Althoughthebusescodedasb usinNPTSfor
schooltripsaremostlikelypublictransitbuses,thepossibil ityofothertypesof
buses(e.g.,privatebus,shuttleservicebus)cannotberuled out.
Another problem may be how accurately actual school trips can b e estimated
from the NPTS data. The NPTS survey collects data from a nation al sample of
householdsonallpersonaltravel,ofwhichschooltripsarea verysmallpart.The
actualnumberofschooltripsinthesampleisrelativelysmall ,whichsuggeststhat
the uncertainty associated with national estimates of these tri ps from NPTS is
large.
Despitetheseshortcomings,NPTSwasbyfarthebestsourceof nationalmodal
informationforschooltripsandusingNPTSforpupiltripsfor bothschoolbuses
and public transit buses provides comparable estimates. NPTS wa s, therefore,
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selectedtoprovideanationalestimateofpupiltransitbusri dershipandschool
busridershipforthisstudy.

Method for Estimating Pupil Fatalities and Rates
Becausethenumberoffatalitiesinvolvingschoolbusesandtra nsitbusesissmall,
oneyearofFARSdatawouldnotbesufficientforthisanalysis.Accordingly,three
yearsofFARSdata(19961998)wereused.Thefollowingsetofcriteriawasused
toidentifypotentialcasesinvolvingchildrenonschooltripsbyschoolbusandby
publictransitbus.
TimeCriteria


SeptemberthroughJune,excludingLaborDay,ThanksgivingandthefollowingFriday,Christmas,NewYearsDay,andtheweekbetweenChristmasandNewYearsDay,andMemorialDay



Monday though Friday



Hours: 6:008:59 and 14:0016:59



Victimcriteria



Age518years



Occupantofabusorvan3orapedestrianinacrashwithanyvehicle



Vehiclecriteria,ifvictimisnotapedestrian



Schoolbusorvan,operatedbyaschool,schooldistrict,orprivatecontractor



Transitbusorvan,operatedbypublictransitsystem

Applyingthesetimecriteriamayexcludecrashesonsomeschooltripsthatoccurredduringregularschoolhours,lateintheday,onweekends,orduringsummer school. Furthermore, because vacation periods and holidays vary between
statesandoftenwithinastatebyschooldistrict,useofthes etimecriteriamay
excludesomecasesthatoccurredonaschooldayandretainoth ersthatdidnot.
However, examination of the distributions of school-age fatalities in school-bus
relatedcrashesrecordedinFARSbymonth,day,andhour(KostyniukandJoksch
2002)showedthatthesecriteriacapturedmostofthecases.Ti meperiodsidentifiedbythetimecriteriaarereferredtoasregularschool-tra velhoursintherestof
thisarticle.
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Pupil Passenger Fatalities

School-agepassengerfatalitieswereidentifieddirectlyfromtheFARSelectronic
datafilesandareshowninTable1.Therewere84crashesinvolvingbuses,ofwhich
10involvedatleast1school-agepassengerfatality.Therewere9crashesinvolving
schoolbusesinwhich12childrenwerekilled.Therewerenosc hool-agechildren
killed as passengers on public transit buses during regular sch ool-travel hours.
However,1school-agepassengerwaskilledonabuscodedinFARSasotherbus.

Table 1. Number of Crashes Involving Buses During
Regular School-Travel Hours

Pupil Pedestrian Fatalities Near Buses

AnalysisofFARSelectronicdatafrom19961998found401fatalcrashesinvolving
pedestriansage518thatoccurredduringregularschool-travel hours.ThePCRs
for all cases were requested from the states through NHTSA. Of the 401 cases,
PCRswereavailablefor388.Reviewofthesenarrativesfoundt hatin14ofthe388
cases,thepersonkilledinthecrashwasnotapedestrianage 518,butsomeother
person involved in the crash.These cases were dropped from further consideration.ThePCRsoftheremaining374caseswerecarefullyread todetermineifthe
victimwasonthewaytoorfromschool,andifanytypeofbus wasinvolvedinthe
crash.AsummaryoftheseresultsiscontainedinTable2.
Furtherreviewofthe374casesidentified73casesinwhichbu seswerespecifically
mentioned (school buses in 58 cases; public transit buses or ot her busese.g.,
city bus or just bus in 15 cases). Of these 73 cases, 24 were dropped from
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Table 2. Initial Sorting of the 401 Cases Involving Pedestrians
Age 5-18 During Regular School-Travel Hours

further consideration because they were not relevant to study ( e.g., the crash
occurrednearabusstopwithnobuspresent;abushappenedto beinthevicinity
butwasnotinvolvedinthecrash;apedestrianwasstruckbya randomvehiclein
thetrafficstreamthathappenedtobeabus).Theremaining48 crasheswerecases
inwhichschool-agepedestrianswerekilledwhileapproachingo rleavingaschool
busorpublictransitbus.Table3showsthedistributionofthesecasesbytypeof
pedestrian-vehicleinteraction.
Exposure

Table4showsthenumbersofpupil-tripsduringregularschool-travelhoursbased
onNPTS.Pupilswhodrovethemselveswereexcludedandthesmal lnumberof
tripsbyintercitybusisincludedintheother/unknowncategory.Therewerean
estimated4.6billionpupil-tripsbyschoolbusand0.3billion pupil-tripsbybus.
Thelattercategoryisreferredtoasthenonschoolbuscategor yintherestofthis
articleandconsistsmostly,butnotexclusivelyoftripsbypu blictransitbuses.
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Table 4. Number (in billions) of Trips between Home and School
by Children, Age 5-18 During Regular School-Travel Hours
from September through June

Results
Passenger Fatalities

PassengerfatalitiesareshowninTable5.Between19961998,therewere12pupil
fatalitiesinninecrashesinwhichapupilwaskilledwhilea passengeronaschool
busduringregularschool-travelhours(fourdeathsannually). Assumingthatthe
crashesarePoissondistributed,4the95percentconfidencerangeisfrom2.1to
7.0.Dividingthesenumbersby4.6billionpupil-tripsperyear byschoolbusgives
arateof0.9pupilpassengerdeathsperbillionpupiltrips,w itha95percentconfidenceintervalof0.5to4.5.
Therewerenoschool-agepassengerdeathsonpublictransitbus esduringregular
school-travel hours during 19961998. However, there was one crash and one
school-agepassengerdeathonboardabuscodedinFARSasother.Assuminga
Poissondistributionforcrashesandschool-agepassengerdeathsgivesa95per53
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centconfidenceintervalfrom0.03to1.9passengerdeathsper yearonnonschool
buses.Dividingby0.3billionpupil-tripsbynonschoolbusperyear,givesarateof
1.1 pupil passenger deaths per billion pupil trips, with a 95 p ercent confidence
intervalfrom0.1to6.2.
Ifonlytripsbypublictransitbusareconsidered,noschool-a gepassengerfatalities
wereobservedduringregularschool-travelhours.Thisgivesa 95percentconfidence interval for the number of fatalities from 0 to 1.2. Beca use there was no
exposuremeasurespecificallyforpublictransitbuses,thenum berofpupil-trips
peryearbynonschoolbuseswasusedtoestimatetherate.The resultingratewas
0witha95percentconfidenceintervalof0to4passengerfat alitiesperbillion
pupilschooltripsbypublictransitbus.

Table 5. Number and Rate of Pupil Passenger Fatalities on School Buses,
Nonschool Buses, and Public Transit Buses
During Regular School-Travel Hours

Pedestrian Fatalities

SchoolBuses. Therewere42pupildeathsnearschoolbusesbetween19961998

(14pupildeathsannually).Theresultingfatalityrateis3.0 pupilfatalitiesperbillionpupil-tripswithaconfidenceintervalof2.2to4.1(Table6).
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Table 6. Estimate of Number and Rates of Pupil Pedestrians Killed Near
School Buses During Regular School-Travel Hours

PublicTransitBuses. In the pedestrian cases involving public transit buses or

other buses in which school-age pedestrians were killed during regular schooltravelhours,allbuseswerepublictransitbuses.However,theestimateofnumbers
andratesofpupilfatalitiesdependsonthelevelofuncertain lythatisacceptedin
determiningifthetripwasindeedaschooltrip.
Itwasknownwithcertaintyinonlyoneincidentthatthechild wasonthewayto
school.Ifcasesclassifiedasdefinitelyorlikelytobeschooltripsareassumedtobe
schooltrips,thenumberofpupilfatalitiesnearpublictransi tbusesincreasesto
three.Ifthetwocasesforwhichitwasnotpossibletodeterm ineifthevictimwas
on a school trip are included, the number of pupil fatalities near public transit
busesinthethree-yearperiodincreasestofive.Table7showsthethreedifferent
estimatesforfatalitiesandratesnearpublictransitbuses.

Table 7. Estimates of Number and Rate of Pupil Pedestrians Killed Near
Public Transit Buses During Regular School-Travel Hours
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Ofthethreeestimates,thefirstislikelytobeconservativeandcanserveasalower
bound.Thesecondestimateismostplausiblebecauseitisbase dontheassumptionthatcaseswithtripsjudgedaslikelytoaschooltripareindeedso.Theresultingestimategivesapupilfatalityratenearpublictransitbusesthatappearstobe
similartothefatalityratenearschoolbuses.Thethirdestim ateincludescasesthat
mayonlypossiblybeschooltripsandyieldsessentiallyaworst-caseestimatet hat
mayserveasanupperbound.
Table8showsthefullrangeofestimatesforthetotal(passengerandpedestrian)
pupilfatalityratesforpublictransitbuses.Therearetwose tsofestimates.Thefirst
setusesthetotalnumberofdeathsonornearallnonschoolbu sesandthesecond
usesonlydeathsonornearpublictransitbuses.Theestimates oftherateofpupil
fatalities per billion school trips by nonschool buses range fr om 2.2 to 6.7, dependingonthelevelofuncertaintyacceptedintheidentificat ionofschooltrips.
Ifonlyknownpublictransitbuscasesareincludedintheesti mation,thisrangeis
from1.1to5.6.

Table 8. Upper and Lower Bounds of Estimate of Rate of
Pupil Passengers and Pedestrians Killed on School Trip
by Nonschool Buses and Public Transit Buses

Figure1showsthemostlikelyestimatesofratesoftransit-bu s-relatedpupilfatalitiestotherateofschool-bus-relatedfatalitiesandtheir95t hpercentconfidence
intervals.Theseaverageratesdonotappeartobedifferentfromeachother.Thisis
truewhetherthepupilfatalityratefromschool-bus-relatedca sesiscomparedto
therateforpublictransitbusesortotherateforthebroade rcategoryofnonschool
buses,whichincludesnotonlythetransitvehiclesbutalsobusescodedinFARSas
other.However,becausethenumberofcasesisverysmall,anydifferenceswould
havetobeverylargetoberecognizable.
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Findings
FatalityratesforgradeK12pupilsonpublictransitbusesan dschoolbuseson
schooltripswereestimatedbasedonfatalitiesinFARSdatafiles,reviewofpolice
crashreports,andexposureinformationfromNPTSdata.Theove rallfindingof
thisstudyisthat,withintheprecisionachievablewiththeav ailabledataandavailableeffort,thereisnorecognizabledifferencebetweenpupilfatalityratesbyschool
busesandbypublictransitbuses.Bothrateswereaboutfourf atalitiesperbillion
pupil trips.
While there was no recognizable difference in rates, the differ ence in absolute
numbers was large because many more children are transported to  and from
schoolbyschoolbusesthanbypublictransitbuses.Thenation wideaveragenumberofpupilsinthekilledgoingtoorfromschoolasbuspass engersorpedestrians
approachingorleavingthebuswasfoundtobe0.3deathsperyear,andpossibly
ashighas1.7deathsperyear(dependingontheuncertaintyacceptedininterpretingcrashrecords)forpublictransitbuses,and18forsch oolbuses.Thevery
low number of pupil deaths by public transit bus greatly limits  the statistical
precisionofattainableestimates.Precisioncouldbeincreased byusingdatafrom
longertimeperiods,perhapsaslongas20years.However,policiesandpractices
changeoversuchlongperiods,introducingothersourcesofuncertainty.
Inadditiontothisbasicdifficultycausedbysmallnumbers,t heprocessofestimatingtheserateswasparticularlychallengingbecauseoflimi tationsindataavailability.Nationalandstatemotorvehiclecrashdatabasesdonotcontainallthe
informationneededtoidentifypupilfatalitiesandeventheor iginalpolicecrash
reportsdonotalwayshavethisinformation.Thelackofexposu redatapresents
anotherproblem.TheNPTSwasthemostcomprehensivesourceof nationaldata
onschooltripmodesavailablebutbecauseitgroupspublictra nsitbusestogether
withallothernonschoolbuses,itwasnotpossibletoestimate pupiltripsorother
exposuremeasuresforpublictransitbusesalonefromthesedat a.
Sufficientlydetaileddatawouldreducetheuncertaintyinfutu reestimatesofpupil fatality rates on public transit buses. Key pieces of infor mation needed are
identificationofapupilonaschooltripandtheindirectinv olvementofpublic
transit buses in pedestrian crashes (crashes in which the victi m was struck by
anothervehiclewhileapproachingorleavingthebus).Nationalandstatemotorvehiclecrashdatafilesidentifycrashesasschool-busrelated ifaschoolbuswas
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directlyorindirectlyinvolved.Asimilarcodefortransit-rel atedcrashesshouldbe
invaluableforidentifyingthecasesinvolvingpublictransitb uses.
More detailed exposure data is also critical for more precise estimates of pupil
fatalitiesbypublictransitbus.TheNPTS,althoughnotfully compatiblewiththe
definitionsofpublictransitbuses,wasthebestnationwidees timateavailablefor
thepresentstudy,becausetheNationalTransitDataBasemaintainedbytheFTA
does not contain information on pupil ridership. Most large pub lic transit systemshaveinformationonpupilridershipandcouldreportit,a lthoughtheyare
notrequiredtodoso.
Changing national crash databases or the national transit syste m reporting requirementsisnotasimpleundertaking.Analternativeapproach couldaddress
thequestionofrelativesafetyofpupiltransportationbythe twobusmodes.A
studycouldbedesignedtocollectinformationaboutschooltri pcrashesatthe
schooldistrictlevel.Suchastudywouldinvolvedevelopingan appropriatesample
andthenrecruitinganumberofschooldistricts,withsomeusi ngschoolbuses,
someusingtransitbuses,andsomeusingbothtypesofbuses.T heschooldistricts
wouldreportallcrashesinvolvingtheirpupilsonschooltrips byschoolbusand
bytransitbusonspecialforms,whichtheywouldcompletewith thecooperation
ofthepoliceagencyinvestigatingthecrash.Theadvantageof thisapproachisthat
the exposure and crash information could be fully matched for t he sample of
pupils.Thisapproachcouldalsobeusedtocollectinjuryinformation.Further,it
neednotbelimitedtothebusmodesbutcouldalsobeusedto determinethe
safetyoftheschooltripbyallmodesoftravel.
The relative risk of childrens travel to and from school by various modes is an
important issue. Only by knowing the relative risks and safety records of each
travelmode,cancommunities,parents,andschooldistrictsmak einformedchoices
thatbalancesafety,communityneeds,andresources.
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Endnotes
49CFR571.3(CodeofFederalRegulations2002)definesascho olbusasabusthat
issold,orintroducedintointerstatecommerce,forpurposest hatincludecarrying
studentstoandfromschoolandrelatedactivities,butdoesno tincludeabusdesignedandsoldforoperationasacommoncarrierinurbantran sportation.

1

ANSI 16.1, ManualonClassificationofMotorVehicleTrafficAccidents defines a
schoolbusasavehicleusedforthetransportationofanyscho olpupilatorbelow
the12thgradeleveltoorfromapublicorprivateschoolorschool-relatedactivity.
Thisvehicleisnotaschoolbuswhileontripswhichinvolvet hetransportation
exclusivelyofotherpassengersorexclusivelyforotherpurpos es.Itisaschoolbus
onlyifitisexternallyidentifiablebythefollowingcharacte ristics:(1)itscoloris
yellow,(2)thewordsschoolbusappearonthefrontandrear,(3)flashingred
lightsarelocatedonthefrontandrear,and(4)letteringonbothsidesidentified
theschoolorschooldistrictserved,orthecompanyoperating thebus.
Theresearchonwhichthisarticleisbaseddidinvestigatethe feasibilityofestimatingpupilinjuriesontheschooltripbytransitbus.Becauseo ftypeandqualityof
dataavailable,themethodsforobtainingnationwideestimates ofpupilinjuries
wereverydifferentfromthoseusedtoobtainfatalityestimate sandarenotreportedinthisarticle.
2

Thevehiclecategoryvanwasincludedinthesecriteriabeca usethereareseparate codes in FARS for van-based school bus and van-based public transit bus.
Van-basedschoolbusesareincludedintheschoolbuscategory,andpublictransitvansareincludedinthepublictransitbuscategoryinthisstudy.
3

The assumption of a Poisson distribution for passenger deaths i s somewhat
tenuousbecausemultipledeathsinonecrashmaynotbeindepen dent.
4
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Valuing Rider Quality
in Swedish Special Transport
Services—New Findings
StigKnutsson,DepartmentofSocialWork,StockholmUniversity

Abstract
TheSwedishSpecialTransportServices,with0.42millionauthorizedpass-holders,is
integratedintotheSwedishpublictransportsystem.ThisarticlecomparesSTSrider
qualitywithpresent-daypublictransportationstandards.
ASwedishriderqualityindexisusedtoexamineastatedprefe rencequestionnaire
sentto2,200randomlychosenridersinStockholm,Göteborg,andoneruraldistrict.
Alogitmodelwasusedforthestatisticalanalysis.
Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboardwasweighedfortheentirepopulationto81
percent,informationto53percent,anddriverassistanceto21 percentregardingtrip
frequency.OneminuteWaitingtimeattelephoneswitchboardcorresponedto17.5
minutestraveltimeinthevehicle.Severalridercatagoriesar ediscussed.
Theresultsofthisanalysishelptobringintofocusdecisivequalitydevelopmentaspectsoftheregularpublictransportationsystemfromacityperspective.Thisis
important,especiallyinencouragingtheelderly,whoexperiencedifferentkindsof
functinaldisabilities,tousetheregularpublictransportatio nsystemmoreoften
thantheydoatthepresenttime.Apublictransportationstandardmustbeoffered
thatisadequateandthatcorrespondsinqualitytowhatbothemployedandelderly
disabledriderswantandneedinaccordancewiththeircapabili ties.Questions
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concerningtimetable,information,anddriverassistancearebr oughtforwardas
importantattractioncomponents.
Introduction
ThemainSpecialTransportServices(STS)travelmodeinSwedenisfärdtjänst.
The färdtjänst mode is comprised of 400,200 STS pass-holders. In 2001 the STS
provided13,556,100one-waytrips(SIKA2002).In2000,Stockho lmCountyalone
had20.8percentofalltheridersinSwedenand25.6percento fallone-waytripsin
thecountry(SIKA2002).Taxicabsandminivansareusedforthetripsandauthority-organized vehicle pooling is the basic passenger quality st andard. The most
typical STS pass-holder in Sweden is a woman with pension benef its (National
Board of Health and Welfare 1998); the most frequent user is, in contrast, an
employedmanaround40yearsold.
Apoliticalpolicyshift,supportedbytheSwedishSpecialTransportServiceAct
1997(SFS1997:736),hastakenplacewithinSTSfromthesocial policyareatothe
transportdomicile.Asaconsequence,since1998STShasbeens eenasanintegratedpartofthepublictransportsysteminSweden.Thequali tystandardofthis
mode must be compared with the standard of the present public t ransport as
opposedtothecommoninterpretationoftheSwedishlegislation (SFS1997:734,
SFS1997:736).TheSTSreformationistheresultofastrongly expresseddemand
forSwedishtransportationpolicyeffectivenessintermsofgov ernmentcostreduction (SFS 1997:736). Actual use of STS has also been dramati cally reduced
duringthelastdecade.Forexample,in1994therewere441,300 STSpass-holders
andtheserviceprovided17,456.100one-waytrips(SIKA2002).
Performanceevaluationmethodsareusefulelementsinthetrans portationdevelopmentprocessatleastasfarbackasPaaswell(1977).Wehavefrequentlyseen
economicalmeasurementsoftransportproductivityfromtheproducerperspective(Gillingwateretal.1995;Thatcheretal.1991).InSwede n,whileithasalsobeen
commontomeasureSTSproductivityfromtheproducerperspectiveintermsof
quantity ahead of quality (Knutsson 1999), some attention has b een given to
riderqualityaspectsandattributes.IntheUnitedKingdom,Su tton(1990)usesa
multinominal logit model to estimate travel demand for STS. McK night et al.
(1986)providesariderqualityindexfortheUnitedStates.Mc Kee(1993)offersan
outlineofariderqualitymodelthatfocusesonrailvehiclesaccessibletodisabled
passengers. In a Swedish context, there is only one published r eport known
(Knutsson1998)tomodelSTStraveldemandintermsofriderqu alityattributes.
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Thisarticlereportsonpartofthe2000follow-upstudyinthe CountyofStockholm,
CountyofÖstergötland,andtheMunicipalityofGöteborg.Itis basedonresults
andknowledgefromthereported1998Swedishstudy(Knutsson19 98).

Methods
AriderqualityindexofSwedishSTS(Knutsson1998,2000)isu sedasaplatform
fortheplannedStatedPreference(SP)experiments.TheIndexo fRiderQuality
(IRQ)outlinesthemostimportantaspectsofriderqualityina Swedishcontext
basedoncustomerutilityandwell-beingintermsoftheright tomakechoices,to
actindependently,andtomaintaindignityandself-esteem.
FormanyyearstheSPtechnique,whichnormallydealswiththe demandofthe
averagepassenger,hasbeenacommontoolusedintransportationresearch(Jones
1989;Pearmainetal.1991;Widlert1992).TheSPshouldbedesignedwithinstinctivefeelingtowardthetargetridergroup.Butaretheplanned SPexperimentsa
good,realistic,andbeneficialstrategyinthisparticularcas e?Basedontheresults
ofacustomerpostalquestionnaire,theanswerhastobeyes.
The2,200receiversofthesurveyquestionnaire,allwithatle astoneSTStripin
1999,wererandomlypickedfromtheSTSpass-holderpopulationintheCounty
of Stockholm, County of Östergötland, and the Municipality of G öteborg. The
responsefrequencywas69 percent.
ChosenkeyattributeswerebasedonthefactthatSTSqualitys tandardshavetobe
comparedwithpassengercomfortinconventionalpublictranspor t.Thesecond
reasonforthechoicewasthedesiretocontinuetoexpandthe methodapproach
from 1998 and to capture the most important attributes that dep ict no timerelatedattributes.FortheSTSpass-holders,thoseattributes arecloselylinkedto
theabilitytoactuallycontrolthetimetableofthetrip.Acr ucialpointistheauthority-organizedvehiclepoolinganditseffectsontheridersspaceofaction.
Theparametersusedinthisstudyincluded:
Information access (vehicle-pooling)


Driverassistance



Frequencyofservice



In-vehicletime



Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard
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Index of Rider Quality (IRQ) of STS
Source:

Attribute
Information

Knutsson 1998

Measurement
Informationaccess
Understandableinformation
Faultlessandcompleteinformation
Unambiguousinformation

Dignity

Beingtakenseriouslyasatraveller
Confidencewithrespecttowhattodoandwheretogo
Personalprivacy
Reliabilityofservice
Dayandnighttimesafety
Medicalemergencycapability
Suitabilityandmotivationofdriver
Courtesyandfriendliness
Familiaritywithpersonalneeds

Comfort

Serviceonweekdays
Serviceonweekends
Punctualityofdeparture
Punctualityofarrival
Freedomfromcrowding
Booking
Follow-uptocomplaints
Fewtravelrestrictions
Prebookingofreturn
Smoothnessofride
Vehicleinsidedesign
Numberofsteps
Spaceandseating
Liftorramp
Distancetovehicle
Driverassistance
Easeofcomplaining
Possibilitytochoosedeparturetime

Traveltime

Reasonablein-vehicletime
Waitingtimeawayfromhome
Switchboardwaitingtime
Totaltriptime
Delaysonvehicle
Prebookingtime
Punctualityofpick-uptime

Fare

Worthitspricecomparedtopublictransport
Fare
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ThesetofvariablesandtheirlevelsaredetailedinTable1.InrelationtotheIRQ
index attributes, the IRQ attribute 31 opportunity to choose departure time is
transformedtofrequencyofserviceinthisstudy.Also,theIRQattribute32reasonablein-vehicletimeisshortenedtoin-vehicletime.Inadd ition,in-vehicletime
incomparisonwithnormalpublictransportminus20minutesinlevelA,representsanimprovementandlevelBplus10minutesstandsforad eterioration.
TheresultsofthisstudyaredependentontheSPdesign.There fore,theselected
levelsoftheattributesareveryimportant.

Table 1. Variables and Levels Used in the Calculations
No

Groupof

Variable

LevelA

LevelB

Informationaccess

No

Yes

All help

Astoday

LevelC

LevelD

Equal

 -10 min.

Attribute

1

Information

(vehicle-pooling)
29

Comfort

Driverassistance

youneed
31

Comfort

Frequencyofservice

Every30min.

Yes

32

Traveltime

In-vehicletime

Minus20min.

+ 10 min.

34

Traveltime

Waitingtimeat

0minutes

5minutes

telephoneswitchboard

Rider attitudes toward authority-organized vehicle pooling, the basic STS performingstandardtoday,isdiscussedlaterinthisarticle.Thisriderqualityaspectis
notanindependentattributeintheIRQindex.Instead,vehiclepoolinghasbecomeanintegratedpartoftheSTSproductionform.Vehiclepoolingconsistsof
alargenumberofIRQattributes(seeTable2).
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Table 2. IRQ Variables Constituting the Authority-Organized
Vehicle Pooling
No

Groupof

Variable

Attribute

1

Information

Informationaccess(vehicle-pooling)

6

Dignity

Confidencewithrespecttowhattodoandwheretogo

14

Comfort

Serviceonweekdays

15

Comfort

Serviceatweekends

16

Comfort

Punctuality,departure

17

Comfort

Punctuality, arrival

18

Comfort

Freedomfromcrowding

19

Comfort

Booking

26

Comfort

Spaceandseating

32

Traveltime

Reasonablein-vehicletime

35

Traveltime

Totaltriptime

To explore the differences between how employment, age, income, and other
socioeconomicvariablesinfluencethecalculationresults,thepopulationwassegmentedusingthefollowingcriteria:


Employment status



Household income



Age



Gender



Typeofmunicipality



Trip purpose



Typeofobstacle



DegreeofSTSuse



Useofpublictransport



Degreeofvehicle-pooling

The chosen segmentation of the population in the study is a com bination of
standard segments and more specific ones. Starting with the tot al population
results, this article discusses the following segments: age gro ups, employment
categories, gender groups, travel purpose, number of one-way trips, mobility
obstacles (e.g., wheelchair respective not wheelchair user resp ective), and user
opinions of authority-organized vehicle pooling.
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Forthestatisticalanalysis,alogitmodel(Algersetal.1987 )wasemployed.The
utilityfunctionwasformulatedasfollows:
u1=p10+p11*FB+p12*VV+p13*HT+p14*RT+p15*P+p16*FBET(1)
where:
p10p16areparameterstobeestimated.

To run the estimations, the ALOGIT program (Hague Consulting Group 1992)
was chosen. Based on the segmentation presented above, 29 estim ations were
made.

Results
The results presented in Table 3 constitute the main findings and relationships
betweenthevariablesusingthefulldatabase.

Table 3. Main Results of Estimated Rider Quality Variables
(in minutes)
Variable

Maximum

Minimum

Median

Mean

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-24.4

-9.9

-16.6

Frequencyofservice

-15.2

-20.9

-21.1

-29.2

Informationaccess

-19.9

-6.0

-11.3

-11.5

Driverassistance

-7.9

-3.0

-5.3

-5.5

-16.9

Main Results

The maximum, minimum, median, and mean values shown in Table 3 are collectedfromthe29differentALOGITestimations.Estimatesare expressedinminutesandthevaluesareallinweightcomparisontooneminute in-vehicletime.

71

JournalofPublicTransportation,Vol.6,No.3,2003

Total Population

Thenonsegmentedcalculationandvalueresultsforthetotalpo pulationareshown
inTable4.

Table 4. Estimation of STS Attributes for the Total Population
Variable

Estimate

T-value

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-0.6431

(-16.1)

Frequencyofservice

-0.7884

(-19.3)

Informationaccess

-0.4182

(-10.5)

Driverassistance

-0.1666

(-4.2)

In-vehicletime

-0.0367

(-18.2)

Observations
Finallog(L)
D,O,F,

3763
-1977.8240
5

Rho²(0)

0.2417

Rho²(c)

0.2117

Asshowninthetable,theoverallaveragecalculationpattern isestablished.Note
thestrongt-valuescomparedwiththeweakert-valuefordriverassistance,which
is weaker in comparison with all other selected variables in the study. On the
whole,however,thechosenvariablesseemtoberelevanttotheneedsoftheSTS
pass-holder,mirroredbytherandomsample.

Table 5. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Total Population
(in minutes)
Variable

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-17.5

Frequencyofservice

-21.5

Informationaccess

-11.4

Driverassistance

-4.5

In-vehicletime

1.0
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TheaveragevaluepathanditsinterrelatedcorrelationsaredepictedinTable5.
Frequencyofserviceisintheunchallengedlead.Accordingto thetotalpopulationinthisstudy,switchboardwaitingtimeisweightedto81percent,information access to 53 percent, and driver assistance to 21 percent of the weight of
frequencyof service.Typically in-vehicletime is far easiertotoleratewhen you
actuallyaresittinginthecar,comparedtowaitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard
orfrequencyofservice.Thesevariablesdepictvitalaspectson,orstrongtoolsfor,
ridertripcontrolor,inotherwords,ourownfeelingofspaceofactionopportunities.Themainproblemisthelackofplanningopportunitiesintheridersdaily
life.Timetableissuesareasimportantforthisgroupofridersasforeverybodyelse.
Age Groups

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboardwasreportedasthemost importantvariablefortheseniorridergroups(Table6).Waitingcanbedifficultevenifyouhave
freetime.Inthiscase,ridersaretotallyboundtothecallsituationandtheiropportunitiestochoosebetweenothertransportmodesaresmallcomp aredtononSTSpass-holders.Naturally,thisisbecausetobeaSTSpass-h oldernormallydefines a crucial mobility or economical obstacle linked to your use of buses or
terminals in the public transport or regular taxi systems. For the younger rider
groups,withemploymentorasimilardaypattern,regular,survivable,repetitious
weekdaytripscaneasilybeorderedinadvance.Inaddition,to organizedailylife
activitiesinsidetheframeworkofconstantlyprebookedtrips, isseenasalimitationtoplanningopportunitiesalimitationonspaceofaction inlife.

Table 6. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Age Groups
(in minutes)
Variable
AgeGroup

1864

6584

>65

<=64

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-15.2

-17.6

-18.5

-15.9

Frequencyofservice

-21.6

-20.0

-20.8

-22.5

Informationaccess

-10.2

-11.2

-11.3

-11.6

*

-4.7

-5.6

*

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Driverassistance
In-vehicletime
*Notsignificantat95percentlevel

73

JournalofPublicTransportation,Vol.6,No.3,2003

Notsurprisingly,frequencyofserviceisvaluedhighestintheyoungergroupand
driverassistanceintheoldestridergroup.Butthefrequencyofservicevalueonly
occupiesrankseveninthetotallist;thatis,sixothersegme ntsputmoreweighton
frequencyofservice.Fordriverassistance,thereisadistinc tvaluationdifference
betweenthelimitgroup6584andtheunlimitedgroup>65.
Employment Categories

In the employed STS pass-holder group, lower values connected with waiting
timeattelephoneswitchboard,frequencyofservice,andinformationaccesswere
observedcomparedtothepopulationasawhole(Table7).Informationaccessis
notanimportantpointhereinrelationtotheothervariables, probablybecause
ofafrequentuseoftheSTSsystem.

Table 7. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Employed/Student
Respective Not Employed/Student
(in minutes)
Variable

Employed/Student

NotEmployed/Student

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-14.4

-18.1

Frequencyofservice

-16.0

-22.4

-6.0

-12.3

*

-4.9

1.0

1.0

Informationaccess
Driverassistance
In-vehicletime
*Notsignificantat95percentlevel

On the other hand, all of the variables in the nonemployed ride r group have
increasedweights,withthesamestartingpointforcomparison. Asdiscussedin
theagegroupsectionabove,thesefactscanbeseeninthelig htofdifferencesin
the demands of daily life. An employed person has more nonnegot iable, timefixedtasksandmeetingstoconfront.
Gender Groups

AsshowninTable8,therankingorderisthesamebetweenthe sexes.Notethe
highweightforfrequencyofserviceanditsrelationinminute stoin-vehicletime
reportedbymaleSTSpass-holders.Incomparisonwiththetotal populationre74
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sults,menareconsistentlymakingahigherattributevaluation .Inotherwords,
menaremoredemandingabouttheSTSservicestandardsidentifiedinthisstudy.
Thefemalevalueforwaitingtimeattelephoneswitchboardiso nly75percentof
themalevalue.Inthisstudy,typical
STSpass-holdersarewomen.Asstatedearlier,theusualSTSpass-holderisawoman
with pension benefits; the most frequent STS user is, in contra st, an employed
younger man.

Table 8. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Gender Groups
(in minutes)
Variable

Men

Women

Difference

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-21.2

-15.9

-5.3

Frequencyofservice

-23.5

-20.2

-3.3

Informationaccess

-12.9

-10.8

-2.1

Driverassistance

-7.4

-3.0

-4.4

In-vehicletime

1.0

1.0

0.0

Travel Purpose

Thisstudylookedatthreetypesoftravelpurposes:worktrips ,visitingtrips,and
hospitaltrips(Table9).

Table 9. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Travel Purpose
(in minutes)
Variable

WorkTrip

VisitingTrip

HospitalTrip

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-14.6

-14.6

-20.4

Frequencyofservice

-20.1

-18.5

-24.2

-10

-9.9

-12.6

*

*

-6.1

1.0

1.0

1.0

Informationaccess
Driverassistance
In-vehicletime
*Notsignificantat95percentlevel
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Waiting time at telephone switchboard to order work trips can, by planning
activitiesinadvance,bereducedinrespecttofrequencyandt hereforeisnotas
highlyvaluedaswewouldexpect.Inthework-tripcase,theva lueofinformation
accessaboutvehiclepoolingisslightlylowerthanforthetot alpopulation.Riders
orderingvisitingtripsaretypicallymorepatientregardingpunctualityofdepartureorarrivalprecision.
Ontheotherhand,hospitaltripsdemandaquickresponsefrom thetelephone
switchboard:Usersneedinghospitaltreatmenttypicallyrequirearapidone-way
ride.Thistripcategoryisclearlyontopinallvalueswhenc omparingthevaluesof
total population.
Infrequencyofservice,thevaluationdifferencesbetweenthedifferenttraveltypes
arewhatwecanexpect.Forhospitaltrips,thevaluationoffr equencyofserviceis
thesecondhighestvalueinthestudy.Onlywheelchairridersplaceahighervalue
onfrequencyofride.
ThevaluesinTable9indicatethatiftheauthoritiesneedtocutSTScosts,they
shouldnotdoitinwaitingtimeattelephoneswitchboardorfrequencyofservice
qualities.Costsshouldbecutbyextendingthein-vehicletime,thatis,whenthe
userisfinallyridinginthevehicle.Totaltriptime,thetotaltimespanfromorderingaridetotheactualarrivalattheagreeddestination,is anotherqualityaspect
nottobeforgotten,butnotcalculatedinthisstudy.
Number of One-Way Trips

Notethevaluelevelsoftheseldom/neverriderfractioninTable10.Thevaluefor
waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboardis17percenthigher,frequencyofservice

Table 10. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Number of
One-Way Trips (in minutes)
Attribute

Daily/Weekly

EveryMonth

Seldom/Never

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-15.3

-14.8

-20.5

Frequencyofservice

-22.1

-21.3

-20.4

Informationaccess

-10.8

-9.2

-12.5

Driverassistance

-4.9

-6.1

*

In-vehicletime

1.0

1.0

1.0

*Notsignificantat95percentlevel
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5percentlower,andinformationaccess10percenthigherthaninthetotalpopulationcalculation.ThesevaluesimplythatSTSpass-holderswh otravelratherseldomneedtohavearelativelyhighertransportationqualitytha nthemorefrequentandexperiencedSTSusers.
Mobility Obstacles: Wheelchair User Respective Not Wheelchair User

STStechnicalperformancediffersbetweenwheelchairridersand otherSTSpassholdersinreferencetovehicledemands(Table11).Usually,wheelchairusersneed
minivantransportasopposedtobasictaxicabs.

Table 11. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Mobility Obstacles:
Wheelchair User Respective Not Wheelchair User (in minutes)
Variable

Wheelchair

NotWheelchair

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-18.5

-17.6

Frequencyofservice

-29.2

-20.6

Informationaccess

-13.6

-11.3

*

-5.0

1.0

1.0

Driverassistance
In-vehicletime
*Notsignificantat95percentlevel

Compared to the total population figures, Table 12 shows that the deviations
expressedinpercentareobvious.Allstatisticallysignificant variablesareincreased
inthewheelchairusergroup,especiallythelevelsoffrequenc yofservicerespective
andinformationaccess.Wheelchairusersmustplanahead,down tothesmallest
details.
Hereagain,thissituationbringsupthediscussionofpersonal alternativecostsin
allrespects.
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Table 12. Comparison between Wheelchair User Respective Not Wheelchair User and Total Population Values (in percent)

Variable

Not
Wheelchair

Wheelchair

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

106

101

Frequencyofservice

136

96

Informationaccess

119

99

*

111

100

100

Driverassistance
In-vehicletime
*Notsignificantat95percentlevel

User Opinions of Authority-Organized Vehicle Pooling

As stated in the introduction, vehicle pooling is the basic qua lity standard of
todays STS performance. Vehicle pooling consists of a large number of IQR attributes.SharingpassengerseatsinanSTSvehicleis,inmany ways,likesharing
passenger seats in the regular public transport buses. In the S TS case, though,
negativequalitiesareadded(e.g.,rideruncertaintyaboutrou teorientationand
timetableissues).Imbeddedintheauthority-organizedvehicle-poolingsituation
isanindefinitelossofspaceofaction,dailylifeoverview, andopportunitiesfor
planningahead.Theselossesneedtobeseenfromaverylong-term,never-ending,
andrepetitiousperspectiveasopposedtooneortwooccasionsweekly.

Table 13. Time Valuation of STS Attributes for Positive, Respective,
Negative Opinion of Authority-Organized Vehicle Pooling (in minutes)
Variable

A

B

C

D

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-18.2

-17.2

-13.2

-9.9

Frequencyofservice

-20.8

-19.0

-15.2

-23.2

-8.5

-9.3

-11.4

-15.5

*

-3.7

-7.9

*

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Informationaccess
Driverassistance
In-vehicletime
*Notsignificantat95percentlevel
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Legend:
A=Indeedpositivetovehiclepooling.
B=Ratherpositivetovehiclepooling.
C=Rathernegativetovehiclepooling.
D

=Indeednegativetovehiclepooling.

Table13showsthegreatvaluespaninthevariablevaluesfortheindeednegative
users.Theindeednegativeriderstovehiclepoolinghavethem oststrikingdeviations in valuation compared to the total population. That is, w aiting time at
telephoneswitchboardisvaluedat57percentlowestofallsegmentsfrequency
of service to 108 percent, and information access to 136 percen t of the total
population weights.
TherathernegativeSTSpass-holdersvaluefrequencyofservicelowestofallsegmentsanddriverassistancehighestofall15statisticallysig nificantsegmentsinthe
study.
Positiveriders,incontrast,areonthewholerathercloseto thetotalpopulation
values.Thevaluationofinformationaccessis,notsurprisingly,lowerinthepositive segments in comparison with the total population pattern. In relation to
informationaccess,theothervariablevaluesinthesegroupsa restronglyincreasing.Theyareplacedinthequalityforefront.
Anotherobservationtotakeintoaccountconcernsdriverassist ance.Therather
positiveridersvaluethisvariabletolessthanhalf,or3.7m inutes,comparedwith
therathernegativeSTSpass-holdersvalueof7.9minutes.The totalpopulation
valueforthisvariableis4.5minutes.
Thesefactspointouttheimportanceofnotviewingthecollect iveofSTSpassholdersasahomogeneousgroupoftransportconsumerswhoreact inthesame
mannertoSTSmodedesignandperformancechanges.
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Discussion
AnimportantpoliticalpolicyshifthastakenplaceintheSTSfromthesocialpolicy
area to the transport domicile. This trend is supported by the Swedish Special
TransportServiceAct1997(SFS1997:736).Since1998,STShasbeenseenasan
integratedpartofthepublictransportsysteminSweden.Theexplicitauthority
intention was, and still is, to reduce  government spending and  make the STS
transportsystemmorecosteffectivefromtheorganizersperspective.Thetransportationauthorityalsoaimedtostimulateanoverflowofpass engersfromthe
expensiveSTStransportsystemtothecheaperregularpublictr ansportbussystem.
SeveralSTSissuesareofvitalinterestfromaregionalplanni ngperspective.TheSTS
servicehasexperiencedareductioninperformance.In2001,th eSTSserved400,200
pass-holders, or 4.5 percent of the Swedish population. In 1994 , 441,300 passholders were accommodated. The total number of STS trips has be en reduced
from17.5millionone-waytripsin1994to13.6millionin2001 .Governmentcosts
in2001wereroughly2billionSwedishkronor,or$U.S.215million.
The authority-organized vehicle-pooling technique is successful from the organizersperspectivebecausethevehiclesarefilledbypickinguppassengersinthe
districtorduringthetripinthedirectionofthedestination.
Basedonthisinformation,aSwedishmethodologyforcalculatin griderqualityin
STSwasdeveloped.Themethodologyusesutilitymodellingprese ntedinaSwedishcontextforthefirsttimein1998(Knutsson1998,2000).T hemodelusedis
basedonthebasiclogitformulationandestimatedwiththeALO GITprogram.
EstimatedriderqualityvariablesareshowninTable3.
Table14showsthevaluationoftheratherorindeednegativetoauthority-organizedvehicle-poolingSTSpass-holders.Toextendthein-vehicletime,incontrast
maybetothenotherevaluedtotaltriptime,istheleastexpe nsivechange.The
subjectforqualitystandardcomparisonisthetimetableintheregularpublicbus
systemincontrasttotaxis.Anotherareatoaddressinvolvesp rolongingthewait
timeattelephoneswitchboard.Onewaytopresentthesesuggest ionsisthrough
strengtheneduserinformationaccess.
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Table 14. Comparison between Rather Respective Indeed Negative
Opinion of Authority-Organized Vehicle Pooling (in minutes)
Variable

Rather

Indeed

Minutes

Minutes

Waitingtimeattelephoneswitchboard

-13.2

-9.9

Frequencyofservice

-15.2

-23.2

Informationaccess

-11.4

-15.5

Driverassistance

-7.9

*

In-vehicletime

1.0

1.0

Fromthepassengerperspective,however,theseproposalsareafurthercutinto
thespaceofactionanddailylifeplanningopportunities.
Forwheelchairusers,oneofthemostvulnerableridergroups, frequencyofservice
ranks as the top quality priority. To thin out frequency of service beyond the
publictransportbusstandardintheregiontofillupthevehi cles,isanexpensive
alternative.
Inseekingthebestalternatives,theorganizerswanttomainta ingoodrelations,
confidence,andgoodwillwithSTSpass-holdersandatthesame time,diminish
customercomplaints.Theiraimiscomfortabletravelforall.
Theriderqualityindex(IRQ)andtheSwedishresultscancontributeconstructivelytowardafocused,decisivequalitydevelopmentwithinth eregularpublic
transportation system from a city perspective. If we are to succeed in this endeavor,apublictransportationstandardmustbeofferedthat,attheveryleast,
correspondstothedemandsandneedsofbothemployedandelder lydisabled
riders.
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Journeys to Crime:
Assessing the Effects of a
Light Rail Line on Crime
in the Neighborhoods
RobinLiggett,AnastasiaLoukaitou-Sideris,andHiroyukiIseki
UCLADepartmentofUrbanPlanning

Abstract
Theimplementationofnewtransitlinesissometimesdoggedbyconcernsthatsuch
linesmayincreasecrimeratesinstationneighborhoods.Affluentcommunitieshave
oftencomplainedthattransitlinestransportcrimetothesuburbs.ThisstudyfocusesontheGreenLinetransitsysteminLosAngelesandexaminesitseffectson
crimeintheadjacentareas.TheGreenLinelightrailsystempassesthroughsome
high-crime,inner-cityneighborhoodsandterminatesatitswesternendinaffluent
suburbancommunities.Thestudyexaminesneighborhoodlevelandmunicipalitywidecrimetrendsforfiveyearsbeforeandfiveyearsafterth einceptionoftheline.A
piecewiseregressionmodelisdevelopedtoevaluatetheimpactoftheopeningofthe
lineinthestationneighborhoods.GeographicInformationSystem(GIS)analysisis
alsoutilizedtoidentifyspatialshiftsincrimehotspotsforthemunicipalitiesabutting
theGreenLine.Thestudyfindslittleevidencethatthetransitlinehashadsignificant
impactsoncrimetrendsorcrimedislocationinthestationneighborhoods,norhas
thelinetransportedcrimefromtheinnercitytothesuburbs.
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Introduction
Doesatransitlinebringcrimetotheneighborhoodsadjacentt oitstransitstops?
Doesamasstransitsystemthatpassesthroughcrime-riddeninner-cityareashelp
transportcrimetothesuburbs?Issuchalineexpandingthera ngeofactionof
potentialcriminalsbyfacilitatingtheirjourneystocrime? Suchconcernshave
earlyondoggedtheplanningandimplementationoflightraill inesinLosAngeles
becauseoftheiralignmentthroughareasvulnerabletocrime.
Criminologistshavecalledtransitstationscrimeattractorsandfeargenerators
(Felsonetal.1990;BrantinghamandBrantingham1995)becausetheycangeneratecrimeanddisorderbyproducingcrowds.Urbanrailwaystati onshavebeen
describedasbehaviorsettingsthatgatherflowsofpeopleont heirwaytowork,
shopping,orrecreation.Somepeopleareeasytargets;beingti red,preoccupied,
carryingpackagesorotherstealableobjects(MyhreandRosso1 996).Butinadditiontocrimeoccurringatthestation,somehavearguedthatm asstransitsystems
havethepotentialofexportingcrimefromoneareatotheother.Accordingto
CanadiancriminologistsPaulandPatriciaBrantingham:

transitshapesthecrimepatternofthecitybymovinglargeproportionsofhigh-risk
populationsaroundthecityalongalimitednumberofpathsanddepositingthemat
alimitednumberofdestinationnodes;awarenessspacesandtargetsearchpoints
becometightlyclustered.Transitshapesthetypesofcrimethatarelikelytobe
committed,byshapingtheopportunityandthegetawaypotentialofhigh-riskpopulations. (1991:93).
Somehavealsoreportedonthedualnatureoftherelationship betweentransit
crime and the environment of adjacent neighborhoods, noting tha t the sociophysicalcharacteristicsoftheimmediatestationareaaffectthedangeratatransit
station. At the same time, the presence of a station affects th e danger in the
immediateneighborhood(BlockandBlock2000).Inanearlierwo rk,theGreen
LinetransitsysteminLosAngeleswasusedtoexaminethefirs tpartofthetransit
crime-environment equation. The effects of socio-demographic a nd physical
characteristicsofstationneighborhoodsoncrimeincidenceat thestationwere
analyzed(Loukaitou-Siderisetal.2002).Thisstudyshowedtha tstationcrimewas
strongly related to ridership. Less serious crime (e.g., vandal ism) was higher in
stationslocatedindenseneighborhoodswithhigherproportions ofyouth.Such
crimetendedtooccurmoreinunkemptneighborhoodswithdeteri oratingbuildingstocks.Certaindesigncharacteristicsofthestationwere relatedtoplatform
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crimeagainstpeople.Atthesametimesomesocio-demographici ndicatorsofthe
neighborhood (income, household size, concentration of youth) w ere also relatedtostationcrime.Finally,certainlandusesinthetransitneighborhood(notablythepresenceofliquorstores)werestronglycorrelatedwit hstationcrime.
Thepresentstudyfocusesontheexaminationoftheeffectsof theGreenLineon
itsadjacentareas.Particularinterestisplacedoninvestigat ingpossiblecrimeinfluencesofthisinner-citylineonitsoutlyingsuburbanareas.Morespecifically,the
studywillrespondtothefollowingquestions:
1. HavetheneighborhoodsadjacenttoGreenLinestationsexperi encedmore
crimeaftertheintroductionoftheline?
2. Hastheintroductionofthelinecontributedtoashiftora dislocationof
crimewithinthemunicipality?
3. Is there a concentration of hot spots of crime in areas adjac ent to the
station?Arethesehotspotscorrelatedwithparticularlandus es?
4. Has the introduction of this line that passes through high-crime, innercityareasbroughtmorecrimetotheoutlyingaffluentsuburban communitieslocatedatitswesternsegment?
Thisarticlebeginsbyoutliningthetheoreticalbackgroundof thestudybysummarizing criminological theories that seek to explain a perpetrators journey to
crime and move through city spaces. This is followed by a liter ature review of
empirical studies that have investigated the crime effect of tr ansit systems on
neighborhoods.Finally,thefindingsofourempiricalresearcharepresentedand
responsesareprovidedtotheaforementionedquestions.

Urban Structure, Mobility, and Crime
Astudyofcrimethatinvolvesaninvestigationofpossibletra nsitinfluenceson
surroundingareasrequiresexaminationoftheconceptofjourneytocrime,the
tripthatanoffendertakestoaccesspotentialcrimes(Plano1 993).Criminaljustice
theoryhassoughttotracetherelationshipbetweenacriminalsmobilityandthe
incidence of crime. As early as the 1930s, ecological theorists  described movementsthroughspaceasrelatedtoopportunitystructures;argui ngthatcriminals
tendtomoveandactincityzoneswheremoreopportunitiesfor crimeareevident(Lind1930;White1932).DecadeslaterBoggs(1966)simila rlysuggestedthat
environmental opportunities, which vary throughout an urban are a, determine
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crimerates.Inawell-knownarticleofthe1970s,CaponeandNicholsarguedthat
criminal mobility is related to urban structure and the analysis of movement
behaviorwillyieldinsightintooffenderdecision-makingands patialpreferences
andcontributesignificantlytoourunderstandingoftheurban systemasacrime
opportunity structure (1976: 200).
Inthelastdecades,criminologistshavebecomeincreasinglyin terestedinthespatialdistributionofcrime,aswellasthejourneysofcriminal stocommitcrimes.
Picturingcriminalsasrationaldecision-makers,theyhavenoted, fromacriminologicalperspective,ifapersonissearchingforatargetto rob,andseveralpotentialtargetsexist,allthingsbeingequal,theclosesttarget willbechosen.Allthings
areneverequal,butitisarguedthatonthewhole,thereisa strongspatialbiasthat
resultsinmoreshorttripsthanlongtripswithinanyparticul arcategoryoftime
(BrantinghamandBrantingham1984:237).Theoreticalworkonthe geometryof
crimehasassumedthattherangeofcriminalactivityforoffen dersisdetermined
byaconstrictedawarenessspacethatisbasedontheirfamiliaritywithparticular
places(home,work,school,mall,park,etc.),andfromareasa djacenttothepaths
thatleadthemtothesesites(BrantinghamandBrantingham1991 ).
Empiricalstudieshaveshownthatcriminalscanoftentravelbe yondtheirimmediate neighborhood to commit property crimes (robbery, burglary, car theft)
(CaponeandNichols1976;Pyle1976).CaponeandNichols(1976) distinguished
between open space occurrences and crime occurrences at fixed premises,
arguing that the former tend to be more spontaneous and not inv olving long
travel,whilethelattertendtorequireadvanceplanningando ftenlongerjourneys
tocrime.However,differentiationexistsbetweenfixedpremises,withliquorstores,
supermarkets,andcashcheckingestablishmentsrequiringlength iertrips,while
residences,grocerystores,andgasstationsexhibitingshorter averagejourneysto
crime. Capone and Nichols concluded: Urban structure and crimi nal mobility
areinextricablylinked,forcriminalmovementbehavioristheproductofanessentiallyrationalstructureofdecision-makingprocessthatinvol vesevaluationofan
objectiveurbanopportunitystructure,thedifferentialattract ivenessofparticular
elementsofthatstructure,andtheuniversalconstraintofdis tance(1976:211).
Whilethereisaconsensusthatcriminalsmaybewillingtotra velacertaindistance
toreachpotentialtargets,somecriminologistshavealsopromotedthedistance
decaytheory.Thisarguesthatcriminaltravelpatternsarecharacterizedbyadistance-decayfunctionthefurtherthedistanceofaplacefromacriminalsplace
ofresidence(orpointoforigin)itislesslikelythatthisc riminalwilltraveltothat
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place to commit a property crime. This is attributed to the fact that potential
offendersdonothaveagoodreconnaissanceofdistantareas(P lano1993).Pyle
(1976)studyingcrimescommittedin27publichousingestatesi nClevelandfound
thatforcrimesagainstpersons,theaveragedistancebetweentheoffendersorigin
and destination was just under 2 miles. For property crimes, th e average travel
distancewas2.3miles(Pyle1976).Similarly,examiningthedi stributionofrobbery
incidentsinMiami,CaponeandNichols(1976)foundthatthefr equencyofrobbery trips declined with increasing distance from the residenti al location of offenders. While findings from these studies seem to support the distance-decay
function, this theory has been recently denounced by Van Koppen  and Keijser
(1997). According to them, studies showing a distance of decay of journeys to
crime rely on correlations in aggregate data that cannot be goo d predictors of
correlationsinindividualcriminalbehavior.
Regardless of whether the journey to crime is influenced by a c onsideration of
distance,itiswellknownthatotherfactorsalsointerveneto enhanceordecrease
theappealofapotentialsiteasatarget.Theseincludethet ypeofexistingland
uses,1levelofpoliceandnaturalsurveillance,environmentalfactors(visibility,lighting, urban form condition, etc.),areaaccessibility,2and perceived opportunities
forescape.

Literature Review
Thecriminologicaltheoriesoutlinedintheprevioussectionse emtogivesupport
tothenotionthattransitlinescanexpandacriminalsrangeofaction.Forone,
rapidtransitsystemscancompresstheamountoftimenecessaryforacriminalto
reach his or her destination, and can familiarize him or her wi th an increased
numberof outlyingareas.Second,the impositionof a majortransportationartery,suchasatransitlineorafreeway,inanareaincreasestheareasaccessibility.In
describing the geometry of crime Paul and Patricia Brantingham (1981) have
arguedthataconcentrationofcriminalactivitiesoccurclosetomajortransportation arteries and highways. Such contentions have supported the  notion that
transitlinesmightbringincreasedcrimetotheareastheyser ve,andhaveoften
fueledaneighborhoodsreactionagainsttheintrusionofarailwayline,especially
inmorewealthy,suburbanareas(Poister1996).Astudyofresidentandbusiness
perceptionspriortotheinitiationofconstructionactivitiesforaMARTAstation
in Atlanta found that crime (after construction) was the second  most major
concernofresidents,aftertrafficcongestion(RossandStein 1985).
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Whiletheoryandpublicperceptionseemtoagreethatnewtransitlineshavethe
potentialtobringmorecrimetothesurroundingneighborhoods, empiricalresearchonthesubjectisquitemixed.Veryfewstudieshaveanalyzedtheeffectof
railwaystationsonsurroundingareas.Inexaminingtheenviron sofChicagorailwaystations,BlockandDavis(1996)foundthatthebulkofrob berieswerenot
concentratedimmediatelyatthestation,butabout1to1½blocksaway.Block
andBlock(2000)foundthesamepatterninBronx,where50perc entofallstreet
robberieshadoccurredwithinabout700feetofatransitstati on.Theresearchers
arguedthatthehighlevelofguardianshipatthestationsnega tedthegreatnumberandgoodchoiceofpotentialtargets.Insteadcrimewasdis placedinthenear
vicinity.
Littleempiricalresearchhasinvestigatedtheissueoftransit -relatedcrimeinoutlying residential or commercial areas by perpetrators who have us ed the transit
system. The findings of such studies are contradictory. In a study that analyzed
policecrimereportsfortransit-relatedcrimeinanunnamedcity,Shellowetal.
(1974) found that criminal predators tended to work in territor ies familiar to
them and were not likely to use public transit as a means for e xtending their
territory or as a means for escape. Examining crime patterns of the neighborhoodsaroundthreeBaltimorestationsforthreeyearsbeforean dthreeyearsafter
themetrolinesopeningPlano(1993)foundthatreportedcrimewasonanupwardanderratictrendaftertheopeningofthestations.However,lackofaccurate
crime locations prevented him from attributing the crime increases to the stationsopenings,orfromidentifyinganydistancetrendsorclu steringpatternsof
thecrimeoccurrences.Ananalysisofburglarytrendsbeforean daftertheopening
oftwoMARTAstationsinsuburbanAtlantafoundnoevidencetosuggestthat
burglaries have increased after the opening of the stations (Po ister 1996). In a
studyofcrimepatternsbeforeandaftertheopeningoftheBlu eLineinLosAngeles Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee (2000) found that in most st ation areas the
introductionofthelightraillinehasreducedcrimeincidence intheimmediate
stationneighborhood.Thestudyalsofoundthatthestationare awasrelatively
saferthanitslargersurroundingcommunities,afactattribute dtothehighdeploymentandvisibilityoftransitpolice.
Thereviewoftheliteraturerevealsthattheempiricalresearchabouttheeffectof
transitonthecrimeratesofadjacentneighborhoodsisquitei nconclusive.The
fewstudiesonthetopichaveproducedmixedorcontradictoryr esults.
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The Context
TheLosAngelesGreenLineisusedasacasestudyinthisrese archtoexplorethe
impactofatransitlineoncrimeinitsadjacentneighborhoods .Theresearchers
test the validity of the assumption that a transit line can tra nsport crime from
high-crime, inner-city areas to low-crime, suburban neighborhoods.
TheGreenLineisalightraillinethatrunsatotalof19.6m ilesfromNorwalk(tothe
east)toElSegundo(tothewest)inLosAngelesCounty(seema pinFigure1).The
linehas14stationsandhadadailyaverageridershipof23,00 0passengersin2000.
Forthemostpart(16.3miles),thelineoperatesinthemiddleoftheI-105Freeway.
As it nears El Segundo the line leaves its alignment in the fre eway median and
continuesforanother3.3milestoitswesternterminusinRedo ndoBeach.Four
suburbanstationsarelocatedalongthissegment,allonelevat edstructures.
TheGreenLinecorridorpassesthoughcommunitiesthatarequit edifferent.The
14station-neighborhoodsvarysignificantlyintermsoftheirl andusesandsociodemographiccharacteristics.Thesuburbanneighborhoodsatthe westernendof
thelinearemoreaffluentthantheinner-cityneighborhoodsinthemiddle.Neighborhoodsattheeasternendcanbecharacterizedasmiddleclas s.Intermsofracial
characteristics, the western neighborhoods are primarily white, the inner-city
neighborhoodsareprimarilyLatinoandAfricanAmerican,whiletheeasternneighborhoodsaremorediverseethnically.Somestationsarewithin primarilyresidentialareas(althoughtheratioofsingleandmultifamilyhousin gvaries).Somestationsaresurroundedbyindustrialfacilities,somebyprimaril ycommercialuses,
whileothershaveamixtureofusesintheirvicinity.
Crime rates in the jurisdictions3 along the Green Line corridor also vary significantly(AEGIS1991)(seeTable1).Atitsmiddlesectionthe linehas stations in
high-crime,inner-cityareas(e.g.,Vermont,Harbor,Avalon,Wilmington,andLong
BeachBlvd.stations).AtitseasternedgetheGreenLinecross escommunitieswith
generallylowtoaveragecrimerates(citiesofDowneyandNorw alk).Atitswestern
edgetheGreenLinerunsthrough(orcomesverycloseto)thelow-crimesuburbanbeachcommunitiesofElSegundo,ManhattanBeach,andRedon doBeach.
Thefactthatthelinepassesthroughbothhigh-crime,inner-cityareasandlowcrime,suburbanareasmakesitagoodcasetotestthevalidity oftheperception
thatrapidtransitbringscrimetothesuburbs.
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Table 1. Jurisdiction Crimes Rates*

*Green Line Security Analysis, April, 1991

Research Design
CrimedatawascollectedforsixcitiesadjacenttotheGreenL ineandsurrounding
12ofthe14stations(datacouldnotbeobtainedforareasadjacenttotheLynwood
station#3andtheNorwalkstation#1).Crimedatabytype4andlocationfor1990
through1999wasobtainedfromthecitiesofDowney,LosAngeles(LAPDservice
areasinthevicinityofthestation),Hawthorne,ElSegundo,M anhattanBeachand
Redondo Beach. Data was geocoded and aggregated to the station neighborhoodlevel(1/2mileradiusaroundeachstation)togenerateaquarterlytimeseries
databaseforthe10-yearperiod.5Toidentifylong-termtrends,thecrimeseries
datasetswerefirstadjustedforquarterly(seasonal)variatio nandthensmoothed
using three-month moving averages (Smith 1991; Poister 1996). S imilarly crime
trenddatawascreatedforthelargermunicipalities/LAPDservi ceareasabutting
the Green Line over the 10-year period. This allowed us to stud y crime trend
changesbyquarterduringthe10-yearperiodbothatthestatio nneighborhood
levelandlargermunicipalitylevel.Tocontrolforotherfactorsinfluencingcrime
rates,6stationneighborhoodtrendswerealsocomparedtocountycrime trends
duringthesameperiod.Additionally,thegeocodedcrimedatawasusedforGIS
analysis,whichattemptedtoidentifyspatialshiftsincrimeh otspotsforthemunicipalitiesabuttingtheGreenLine.
ThestudyoftheGreenLineentailsamethodologicalproblem,s ince,forthemost
part,thelinerunsinthemiddleoftheI-105Freeway,whichcouldalsotheoretically increase the accessibility of likely offenders to outlying suburban areas. To
separatethecrimeeffectsofeachstationontheadjacentneig hborhoods,thelevel
ofcrimeintheareasaroundtheGreenLinestationswasexamin edduringthree
93

JournalofPublicTransportation,Vol.6,No.3,2003

differenttimeintervals:(1)January1991toSeptember1993(p riortotheopening
oftheI-105Freeway);(2)fromOctober1993toAugust1995(wh entheGreen
Linestartedoperation);and(3)fromSeptember1995toDecembe r1999.
Additionaldatacollectedforourearlierstudy(Loukaitou-Side risetal.2002)provided information on socio-economic characteristics of the popu lation in the
stationneighborhoodaswellastheprimarylandusesintheneighborhoods.We
also had data from the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) on
boardingsandalightings(ridership)bystation(Table2).

Table 2. Station Neighborhood Characteristics

Crime Trend Analysis
Nonautorelatedseriouscrime(Type1)againstpersonsbegandecreasinginLos
AngelesCountyfromapeakofabout145,000crimesperquarter attheendof
1991toalowofunder80,000crimesperquarterbytheendof 1999(Figure2).
Type1crimerelatedtoautosalsodeclinedoverthesametimeperiod.Startingat
theendof1991,thenumberofcrimesdecreasedfromapeakof about35,000in
1991toalowofabout12,000in1999.
Most areas surrounding the Green Line stations experienced simi lar declining
trendsinType1crime.Figure3,forexample,showsdecreasingnumbersofType1
nonauto crime in the station neighborhoods in the LAPD/Central jurisdiction.
The present analysis focused on whether crime trends in the station neighbor94

Figure 2. Los Angeles County Crime Trend (1990-2000)
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hoods(operationalizedas½-mileradiussurroundingthestation )differedsignificantly from trends in the larger jurisdictions along the Green Line and/or the
countyasawhole.Wasthereanincreaseincrimeafterthefre ewayorGreenLine
opened? Or, in the case of a decrease in station neighborhood crime, was the
decreaselessthanwhatwouldbeexpectedbasedonlargerarea trends?
ToevaluatetheimpactofboththeopeningoftheI-105Freewayandtheopening
oftheGreenLine(shownbyreferencelinesonthetrendgraphs )oncrimeinthe
stationneighborhoods,thefollowingpiecewiseregressionmodel wasdeveloped
foreachstation:7

Totalcrimes=b +b *Time+b *FWOPEN+b *GLOPEN+b *IPOSTFW+
b *IPOSTGL + b *CONTROL
0

5

1

2

3

4

6

where:

Totalcrimes

equalsnumberofType1NoAuto,Type1Auto,orType2crimes
inthestationneighborhoodseasonallyadjustedandsmoothed

Time
FWOPEN

representsquarter(2ndquarter1990istime0)
isthedummyvariableforopeningofCenturyFreeway:
=0,before4thquarter1993(Time<14)
=1,4thquarter1993andafter(Time>=14)

GLOPEN

isthedummyvariableforopeningofGreenLine:
=0,before3rdquarter1995(Time<21)
=1,3rdquarter1995andafter(Time>=21)

IPOSTFW

equals(Time-14)*FWOPEN(Measureschangeinslopeafterfree
wayopens)

IPOSTGL

equals(Time-21)*GLOPEN(MeasureschangeinslopeafterGreen
Lineopens)

CONTROL

isthetotalcrimeatlocalcity/jurisdictionleveloratLACounty
levelusedtocontrolforotherfactorsinfluencingcrimerate
trends.
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Tables3and4showresultsoffittingthepiece-wiseregressio nmodeltocrimetime series data for each of the station neighborhoods. In the Table 3 models,
crimetrendsatthelocaljurisdiction/citylevelareusedforcontrolwhileLosAngelesCountycrimetrendsareusedascontrolinTable4.8Significantchangesinslope
andinterceptpost-freewayandpost-GreenLineareindicatedwi tha+or-in
thecorrespondingtablecell,andpositivechanges(increasesi ncrime)following
theopeningoftheGreenLinearefurtherhighlightedwithshad ing.

Table 3. Regression Model Results
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Table 4. Regression Model Results
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Inner-city Stations

AftertheopeningoftheGreenLine,crimeintheinner-citystationsfollowedthe
decliningtrendswitnessedthroughoutLosAngelesCounty(Figure3).However,
forfourinner-citystations(#6,#7,#8,and#10)thedecreaseinnonautorelated
Type1crimewaslessthanwhatwouldbeexpectedbasedonthelargerareatrends
(Table3).Thesefourstationswereinjurisdictionswithsignificantlyhighercrime
ratesthanthecountyasawhole(Table1).Theytended,however,tohavelower
numbersofcrimesthanotherstationsinsimilarareas(seebar chartsinFigure4
whichcompareaveragecrimelevelsinstationneighborhoods9).Forexample,the
neighborhoods around stations #6 and #7 had lower numbers of cr imes than
stations#4and#5.
Thefourinner-citystationsthatwitnessedasignificantincreaseinslopeinnonautorelatedType1crimehaddifferentlanduses.Stations#6and#7wereprimarilyin
residentialneighborhoodswithsimilarpopulationdensityanddemographiccharacteristics.Theneighborhoodaroundstation#8intheCityof Hawthornehada
lowpopulationdensityandprimarilyindustriallanduses.Fami liesthatlivedin
thisstationneighborhoodweremostlymiddle-incomehomeowners. Station#10,
which is close to the Los Angeles airport, was surrounded by va cant lots and
parkinglotswithsomeindustrialandofficebuildings.
Two inner-city station neighborhoods (#6 and #8) also witnessed a significant
increase in slope for the post Green Line Type 2 crime trend. In particular, the
neighborhoodofHarborStation(#6)sawanabsolute increase in Type2crime
following the station opening.
The Eastern Suburbs

CrimedataforthesuburbanCityofDowneywasonlyavailablef romlate1993so
itwasdifficulttocomparepre-andpost-I-105Freewaycrime trends.NonautorelatedType1crimepeakedfortheCityasawholeshortlyaftertheGreenLine
openedandhasbeendecliningsincethen(Figure5).Incontras t,nonauto-related
crimeintheneighborhoodofstation#2hasremainedrelatively stableatabout25
crimesperquarter,whileType2crimehasincreased,indicatingthattheintroductionoftheGreenLinemayhavehadsomenegativeinfluenceonstationneighborhoodcrimerates(Table3).
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Figure 4. Average Quarterly Crime Rate in Station Neighborhoods
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Figure 5. Crime Trends at Eastern Suburb Station Neighborhoods
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The Western Suburbs

Wegaveparticularemphasisindocumentingandanalyzingshiftsincrimetrends
atthewesternendofthelinetotesttheassumptionthataninner-citylinebrings
crimetothesuburbs.Significantly,wedidnotobserveanyincreaseincrimetrends
in the suburban stations at the west end of the line. In fact, in station #14 in
RedondoBeach,wewitnessedastatisticallysignificantdecreas eincrimeinthe
station neighborhood after the lines opening (Table 3, Figure 6). Comparing
stationneighborhoodcrimetothecountywidecrimetrends,wea gaindidnotsee
significantchangesinthewesternsuburbanstations,withthe onlyexceptionof
anincreaseinauto-relatedcrimeinstation#13(Table4).
Morespecifically,theCityofElSegundo,whichisatthewesternendoftheI-105
Freeway,hasrelativelylowlevelsofcrime.Type1crime,whichincreasedinthe
period after the freeway opened, has been decreasing since the opening of the
GreenLine(abouta50%decrease).Auto-relatedType1crimehasalsobeencutin
half.ThetwostationneighborhoodsinElSegundo(#11and#12) hadfewcrimes;
however,auto-related crimehas been increasing in recentyears.Theregression
model for station #11 shows a significant post-Green Line incre ase in slope for
auto-relatedType1crimeaftercontrollingforlocaltrends(i.e.,trendsintheCity
of El Segundo). However, when numbers of crimes are small (in this case autorelatedType1crimehoversbetween5and10crimesperquarter),adifferenceof
justafewcrimescanmakeitlookasifthereisasignificant changeintrend.
Station#13islocatedattheboundaryofElSegundoandManhat tanBeachinan
areaofrelativelynew(sinceearly1990s)upscaleretailandc ommercialdevelopment.10 While Type 1 crime has been decreasing in the adjacent municipalities
since1993,weseeadifferentpictureintheareaimmediately surroundingstation
#13,wheresuchcrimehasbeenonanupwardtrendsincetheear ly1990s.However,therehasbeennosignificantchangeinthistrend(i.e.,increaseinslope)with
theopeningoftheGreenLine(Figure6).Rather,theincreaseincrimeismostlikely
attributabletonewdevelopmentssincetheearly1990s,suchas officebuildings,
restaurants,movietheaters,andspecialtystoresthathaveatt ractedmanyvisitors
tothearea.Station#14,whichisontheboundaryofRedondoB eachandsouthernHawthorne,isthewesternterminusoftheGreenLine.Aswi thstation#13,
therewasanincreasingtrendinType1crimesinthe½-milearoundthisstation
althoughthishasdecreasedsincetheopeningoftheGreenLine (theregression
modelsshowasignificantnegativechangeinslope)(Figure6). Therewasmore
Type 2 crime in the area around station #14 (about three times the level as at
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station#13).WhiletherewasconsiderablefluctuationintheType2crimetrendit
seemedtobegraduallyincreasing.Particularlandusesaround station#14,suchas
a continuation high school and a large discount retail shopping  area, may be
contributingtocrimehere.

Hot Spot Analysis
Crimespecialistsoftenarguethatalocalizeddecreaseincrim emaybeelusive,as
crimemaybedislocatedtoneighboringsitesinresponsetocer tainchanges(e.g.,
morepolicing,newlanduses,etc.).Therefore,inthispartofthestudy,GISand
spatialanalysistechniqueswereemployedtoexaminechangesin thespatialdistributionofcrimesinthecommunitiesservedbytheGreenLine.G eocodedcrime
datawasconvertedintocrime-densitygridmaps(usingArcView SpatialAnalyst)
toidentifyandmaphotspotsofcrime(concentrationsofincid ents).Analysisof
thesemapswasfollowedbyobservationalstudiesoftheareasi dentifiedashot
spotsofcrime.
Mapsshowingaveragecrimedensity(hotspotsofcrime)forthe periodsbefore
andafter11theopeningoftheGreenLinecanbeseeninFigures7and8. Themaps
inFigure9showthedifferencesincrimeconcentrationsbetwee nthetwotime
periods.TheuppermapinFigure9showshotspotsofcrimeinc rease,wherethe
lowermapindicatesareaswherecrimehasdecreased.
Figures7and8showhighconcentrationsofbothType1andType2crimesinthe
LACentralareabeforeandaftertheintroductionoftheGreen Line,althougha
significant decrease in crime density can be noticed (Figure 9) . Our fieldwork
showedthatthefewcrime-densityincreasesorshiftsindensit yintheLACentral
areatookplaceinpublichousingdevelopments.
CrimeinHawthornewasprimarilyconcentratedalongthecommercialcorridor
ofHawthorneBoulevard(Figure10),whichrunssouthfromstati on#9,aswellas
inthesoutheastcorneroftheCity,anareaquitefarfromtheGreenLine.Both
theseareashaveseenadecreaseincrimedensitysincetheope ningoftheGreen
Line.Onlyonenewhotspothasemergedintheneighborhoodjus tsouthofthe
GreenLinebetweenstations#8and#9(Figure9),inaresident ialareawithsinglefamily,detacheddwellingunitsofvaryingcondition(manywithbarsonthewindowsanddoorsasshowninthephotoinFigure11).
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Figure 7. Type 1 Crime Hot Spots Before and After the Green Line Opening
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Figure 8. Type 2 Crime Hot Spots Before and After the Green Line Opening
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Figure 9. Type 1 Crime Density Change Before and After the Green Line Opening
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Figure 10. Howthorne Blvd., South of Station #9

Figure 11. Single Family Neighborhood with Increased Crime

Therewerenohotspotsofserious(Type1)crimeandonlyafewhotspotsofType
2crimeinthewesternsuburbs.Therehasbeenaslightlyhighe rconcentrationof
Type1crimenearstation#12inElSegundosincetheGreenLineopeningbutthis
islikelyduetotheincreaseddevelopmentinthearea.Overall ,thebeforeandafter
picturesdonotshowanysignificantchangesintheconcentrati onofcrime.
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Conclusions
Attheendofthestudy,wefindnoevidencethatthistransitlinehasopenedup
newandoutlyingterritoriesforexploitationbypotentialcrim inals.Overall,most
station neighborhoods have either experienced no change or have  witnessed a
reductionincrimeaftertheintroductionoftheGreenLine.Transithascertainly
notbroughtmorecrimetotheaffluentsuburbanareas,whichhavecontinuedto
enjoy relatively higher levels of safety and prosperity than th e County average.
Somecrimeincreasewaswitnessedintheinnercity,wherelimitedspillovereffects
ofcrimefrommorehighcrimetolesscrime-riddenareaswereobserved.However,
majorshiftsanddislocationofcrimehavenotoccurredwithin themunicipalities
thatsurroundtheGreenLine.Wewerealsounabletonoticearelationshipbetweenhotspotsofcrimeandproximitytoatransitstation.Ra thertheexistenceof
hot spots could be better explained by the presence of certain land uses (e.g.,
concentrationofretailalongabusycommercialstreet,existen ceofahighschool,
orapublichousingdevelopment).
Thisstudyislimitedbythefactthatitonlyexaminedonelig htrailline.Alsothe
findingscannotproveordisprovethedistance-decaytheory,aswewerenotaware
ofthepointsoforiginofthedifferentcriminalswhocommitte dcrimesinstation
neighborhoods.However,itseemsclearthatcriminalshavenotusedtheGreen
Linetoaccesspotentialtargetsmilesaway.Thejourneytocrimehasnotbecome
easierbecauseoftheGreenLine.
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Endnotes
RhodesandConly(1981)foundthatcriminalstendtobeprimar ilyattractedto
commercialandtransitionalareas,followedbyindustrialareas .Residentialareas
areconsideredlessattractive.Multiple-familyhousingtendst oattractmorecrime
than single-family housing.

1

 Comparisons of high- and low-crime neighborhoods have shown th at area
accessibilityisassociatedwithhighcrime(EckandWeisburd1995).

2
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TheGreenLinecrosses13politicaljurisdictions:Norwalk,Downey,Paramount,
South Gate, Lynwood, City of Los Angeles, Inglewood, Hawthorne, El Segundo,
Manhattan Beach, Redondo Beach, Lawndale, and unincorporated ar eas of Los
Angeles County.

3

ForclassificationpurposestheFederalBureauofInvestigatio nhasclassifiedcrime
intotwomajorcategories:Type1crime(criminalhomicide,forciblerape,robbery,
aggravatedassault,larcenytheft,burglary,grandautotheft,andarson),andType
2crime(crimeoflessseriousnatureagainstpeopleandtheir property,suchas
pettytheft,disorderlyconduct,vagrancy,non-aggravatedassaults,drugviolation,
etc.).Forpurposesofthisstudy,wefurtherdividedType1crimeintononautorelatedcrimesversusauto-relatedcrimes.Crimeclassificationswerenotconsistentacrossthevariousjurisdictionsfromwhichcrimedatawascollectedmaking
itdifficulttocomparecrimestatisticsacrossjurisdictions.
4

Crimesusedinthisstudydonotincludecrimesatthestation sorthestation
parkinglots,whichwerereportedinLoukaitou-Siderisetal.(2002).Wearelookingratheratchangesincrimelevelsintheneighborhoodssurr oundingthestations and shifts in crime locations in the larger jurisdictions  around the Green
Line.
5

 Historically, crime trends have followed economic/employment trends (Koch
CrimeInstitute1998).Thestudyreportedinthisarticlecoinc idedwithaperiodof
economicgrowthandadecliningcrimetrendnationwide.
6

VariablesassociatedwiththeopeningoftheI-105Freewaywer enotconsidered
inthemodelsforstations#2,#13,and#14.Sufficientdatawa snotavailableto
developaprefreewaytrendforstation#2.Stations#13and#14 arenotlocatedin
thevicinityoftheI-105.

7

Type2crimetrenddatawasnotavailableatthecountylevel.

8

Crimedatacouldnotbecollectedforthefull½-mileradiuss urroundingsomeof
thestationsduetodifferencesinpoliticaljurisdictions.Cri medatacollectedfor
eachstationneighborhoodwasweightedtoaccountforareadiff erencesforcomparisonpurposesinthebarcharts.
9

Sincethisstationaswellasstation#14arenotparticularly closetotheI-105
Freeway and are located within a few of blocks of the older 405 Freeway, the
10
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regressionmodelsusedforbothstationsdonotincludedummyv ariablesforthe
I-105 Freeway.
 Crime-density maps are based on data for seven quarters before  and seven
quartersaftertheopeningoftheGreenLine.
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